Why are Shiites keen to violate the Sunnis in the date of their feasts?

It is not clear to us the reasons and history of the split between the two main schools of Islam. Sunnis and Shiites, regarding the announcement of the crescent of the month of Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr, and all the details of the Hijri calendar, or what is known as “the crescents and times.” In most cases, there is a difference of one day between the two crescents; The crescent of the Shiites does not appear on the same day as the crescent of the Sunnah, and they do not coincide. Usually, the crescent of the Shiites is one day later than the crescent of the Sunnah, and therefore, the Shiites’ Ramadan, Eid and Ashura are one day later than the Ramadan of the year and their Eid and Ashura.

It is not clear to us whether this division goes back to the early Islamic ages, or is it specific to the modern era, especially in Iraq, where the Shiite religious establishment is centered, and where the state (the pre-2003 state) is the Sunni sect, the one who announced the sighting of the crescent in it was the Mufti of Iraq and the first Sharia judge, two official Sunni religious positions.

It seems beyond logic and reason, and cannot be easily understood. I do not understand how the crescent, which was seen by millions, perhaps tens of millions, of Sunni Muslims, over tens, perhaps hundreds of years, and in a very wide geographical area, was not seen by any Shiite.

If the matter does not stem from differences in jurisprudence and its principles, then it stems from something further… politics, for sure. And add to it the hidden Shiite hatred that came out into the open on this subject, to the extent that one of their scholars said, “He went against the Sunnah, even if they were right.”

In Iraq, the (Sunni) state monopolized the drawing of the symbolic space of the state, including the new moons and timings. Therefore, the Shiite religious establishment’s difference in fixing the crescent was part of the “symbolic distinction” of the Shiite community. Rather, this was an expression of their refusal to integrate into the state, not out of an anarchic political philosophy espoused by the Shiites, but because the struggle over the state ended against their interest.

Thus, just as the Shi’a jurists forbade members of the sect to work in public offices, they had to declare that the Shi’ite Ramadan and their festivals differ from the Ramadan of the state and its festivals. The Shiite community is not a partner in power, however, it has its own status; Its symbols, its limits, and its own logic.

This was important to Shiite scholars. In the 1990s, Muhammad al-Sadr issued a fatwa that Ziyarat 15 Shaban (the birth anniversary of Imam al-Mahdi in the Shiite narrative for which Shiites hold huge rituals in Karbala) must be performed, which is not obligatory. Then he came back to cancel this obligation two days before the visit. This was an area for testing (and building) the morals of obedience in the Shiite community.

Gradually, the difference in declaring the crescent of Ramadan and the holidays became a tradition that characterizes the Shiite religious establishment, which did not end until after 2003, when the Shiites rose to power, when the division became officially enshrined.

In-depth, the difference in the crescents and the legal timings went beyond being a “symbolic expression.” It is part of the failure of the nation-building process, and of a process that was rebuilding cross-border solidarity, uniting the Shiites of Iraq with the Shiites of the world, and separating them from their fellow countrymen, the Iraqi Sunni Muslims.

In summary, the Shiites need many things to correct their approach, but in this field they need exceptional leaders, who see the interest of the sect and its sons in safe coexistence with the sons of other sects, not by making them permanent soldiers, ever ready, to confront their partner in the land, history, and destiny.