Hezbollah Faces Two Options: Continue Containing Israeli Strikes or Engage in All-Out War

The recent “pager” and other wireless device attacks carried out by Israeli forces in Lebanon over Tuesday and Wednesday may be the hardest blow Hezbollah has faced throughout its history, according to analysts close to the party. These attacks represent an unprecedented breach of security, catching the group off-guard with previously unseen tools, shattering the deterrence policy Hezbollah had established with Israel for many years.

Undoubtedly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now feels a sense of triumph, especially with the decline in opposition protests against him on the streets of Israel. The opposition had been pressuring him to hasten a deal with Hamas to retrieve Israeli prisoners. Netanyahu shifted the media’s attention towards Lebanon following these attacks, which claimed the lives of 32 Lebanese and injured around 3,250 others, opening the door to greater escalation in the north.

According to the Hebrew press, Netanyahu now sees two scenarios: either deterring Hezbollah and forcing an agreement in the north to return Israelis to their homes, or using Hezbollah’s furious reaction as justification for launching a full-scale war on Lebanon, something Netanyahu would be able to explain to the international community.

What Does Netanyahu Want from These Dangerous Strikes on Hezbollah?

American and Israeli reports suggest that Hezbollah was on the verge of discovering an operation Israel had been planning for years. The plan involved planting explosive devices in thousands of pagers that Hezbollah had distributed to its members. Just moments before the operation was “burned,” Israel decided to act. The result was a devastating blow to Hezbollah’s operations and the morale of its support base. Thousands of Hezbollah fighters were wounded across various regions in Lebanon, revealing that their combat operations were more vulnerable to Israeli penetration than previously believed.

In February, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly instructed party members to stop using smartphones, fearing they had been infiltrated by Israeli intelligence. Instead, party members were supplied with older pager models, assuming they were more secure and less susceptible to infiltration.

However, the shift to pagers proved disastrous, and the situation extended to wireless communication devices as well. As analyst David Ignatius of The Washington Post pointed out, “Israel turned the secure tool used by Hezbollah into a weapon against them.”

By Tuesday afternoon, within minutes, Israeli media shifted its focus from reports of Netanyahu’s intention to appoint “Hope Party” leader Gideon Sa’ar as Defense Minister in place of Yoav Gallant, to the escalating scene in the north and the potential for a wider war with Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s Dilemma: Two Choices, No Third Option

Israeli writer and analyst Amos Harel suggests that, at least theoretically, there is a real danger that Hezbollah may escalate the border conflict into a full-scale war in response to the “humiliating attack” it suffered in the heart of Beirut.

However, some argue that Hezbollah is compelled to avoid getting dragged into Netanyahu’s strikes and must continue its policy of containment, albeit with increased attacks on northern Israel. Netanyahu now needs justifications for launching an unprecedented and overwhelming assault on Lebanon, potentially mirroring the destruction seen in Gaza.

On the other hand, continuing to contain Israeli strikes without an adequate response will erode Hezbollah’s deterrence policy, emboldening Israel to deliver more painful blows than Hezbollah or Iran might imagine. This would tarnish the image Hezbollah has carefully built over the years, at least among its support base in Lebanon. For this reason, Hezbollah, even though it has long since lost the element of surprise, may be forced to engage in a broader war with Netanyahu and expand the conflict using new weapons.

Israel’s Changing War Objectives

Israel’s war objectives were only revised during the Israeli cabinet meeting on Monday night, on the eve of the operation, to include the “return of displaced people from the north to their homes” (although Netanyahu had been presenting this as a goal in his speeches for several weeks). It may take several more days before it becomes clear whether Israel’s leadership has prepared any strategic moves in the aftermath of the blow Hezbollah received on Tuesday and Wednesday. Will Israel continue to strike Hezbollah, or will it consider the damage done sufficient, assuming Hezbollah has been sufficiently intimidated?

There are plausible reasons why Netanyahu agreed to revise the war objectives now and shift Israel’s northern strategy. The main reason is the stalemate in Gaza, where Israel failed to secure a decisive victory or retrieve prisoners to satisfy the Israeli public. Netanyahu promised to destroy Hamas’s capabilities entirely and quell their power, putting an end to the daily attacks that exhaust the Israeli army.

Another factor is that Netanyahu hopes the increasing pressure in Lebanon will eventually push Hezbollah to the brink of collapse, leading it to sever ties with Hamas and detach its attacks from any agreement related to Gaza. Netanyahu believes that Nasrallah will conclude that the cost Hezbollah pays for supporting Hamas in Gaza is too high.

Based on this assumption, Nasrallah may seek to reach a unilateral ceasefire agreement under which Hezbollah’s elite Radwan units would withdraw to north of the Litani River. This would allow at least some Israelis to return to their homes on the Lebanese border, saving Netanyahu’s face before the angry Israeli public.