Israel seeks to isolate Gaza from Lebanon, but it’s easier said than done

In need to divert public discourse from freeing Israeli captives and the open-ended war on Gaza, a war on Lebanon was the ideal move for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 

The escalation, which began with the explosion of pagers and radio devices across Lebanon last week, has, in this regard, been a success so far. 

The issue of the captives has been removed from the public agenda in Israel, although it is unclear how this escalation will contribute to their return – or that of the north’s residents back to their homes. Additionally, the military’s heavy bombardment of Lebanon has brought Netanyahu closer to the army. 

Israeli defence philosophy has been based on “deterrence” for decades. This was the philosophy behind Israel’s policy versus Hamas over the past 15 years: to hit the Palestinian movement hard every time it breaks the status quo, as determined by Israel. 

But this deterrence was severely undermined by the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October, which saw Israeli defences fall to the Palestinian fighters within three hours. 

Now in Lebanon, this discourse is back: striking there is a means for Israel to regain its deterrence, and in this Netanyahu and the army are united. 

The recent “successes” of the Israeli military in Lebanon – the pagers blasts, the killing of many Hezbollah high commanders, and the heavy bombing across southern and eastern Lebanon – are attributed to Netanyahu.

Therefore, the premier’s image as a forward-looking leader who does not give in to pressure, neither from the army nor from the Americans, has been strengthened. The feeling in Israel is that the country has restored its deterrence in the Middle East, very much thanks to Netanyahu.

The attacks on Lebanon enjoy broad support in Israel, not only among Netanyahu’s supporters but also in the military establishment and centre-left opposition.

Yair Lapid, the head of the opposition; Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s former partner in the war cabinet; and Yair Golan, leader of the Zionist left-wing Democrats party, have all been supportive of these moves.

This Zionist centre-left has always been influenced by the army’s positions, and now, when the military and Netanyahu are joining forces, it accepts the assumption that there is a need to reinstate Israel’s deterrence.

The centre-left does not offer a vision of a political settlement with the Palestinians and only wants “calm”, and it believes this could be achieved through deterrence vis a-vis Hezbollah.

A ground invasion not in Israel’s interest

Yet it seems that a ground invasion of southern Lebanon to push Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force beyond the Litani River may not fit Israel’s intentions at the moment.

What Netanyahu and the army want now is to pressure Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire in Lebanon, renouncing its support to Palestinians in Gaza, without having to send ground forces into Lebanon. Deter Lebanon, not occupy it, as it did with Gaza in the 15 years before 7 October.

Since the ground invasion of Gaza in late October, Palestinian fighters have killed nearly 350 Israeli soldiers and wounded thousands, according to the Israeli military. Taking territory in southern Lebanon could extract a much higher price in soldiers, as the geography there is much more complicated than in Gaza and Hezbollah is much better equipped than Hamas.

Invading Lebanon would probably drag Israel into a long war, and a long war contradicts the very idea of deterrence, according to which aerial bombing can replace ground operations.

In addition, while the Gaza Strip is not internationally recognised as being a part of a sovereign state, invading Lebanon would mean invading a sovereign state, and such an act has a stronger chance of igniting a regional war.

Countries like Iran, Syria and Iraq – or maybe even other Arab countries – may feel a need to react if Israel invades an Arab sovereign state. Therefore, at least for now, a full ground invasion into southern Lebanon is not something Netanyahu or the army are interested in.

Israel is currently experiencing a state of euphoria following what the Israeli public sees as military successes with the attacks on Hezbollah. Israelis feel that almost a year into the war, Israel has taken the initiative and restored its deterrence in the Middle East.

Iran’s diplomatic offensive, which was expressed in the meeting of the new Iran president, Masoud Pezeshkian, with Jews and an Israeli academic in New York, and his measured speech at the UN General Assembly, are seen in Israel as proof that its deterrence is also working on Tehran. 

Nonetheless, an Israeli ground invasion is still possible. Public pressure may begin to form in this direction. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis are affected by Hezbollah’s missiles, adding to the 60,000 residents of the north who were already evacuated from their homes since 8 October due to the cross-border exchanges of fire.

If Hezbollah continues to fire missiles despite Israel’s recent wide-scale attacks, pressure may build on the Israeli government and army to send troops into Lebanon, as this may be seen as the only way to stop Hezbollah’s attacks and allow Israelis to return to their homes in the north. 

What hides behind the escalation 

The real goal of Israel behind the recent escalation is to pressure Hezbollah directly, by military force, or indirectly through intermediaries, to reach a ceasefire agreement. By achieving this, Israel seeks to divide Hezbollah from its ally Hamas.

In this sense, pushing the Radwan Force beyond the Litani River and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 are secondary for Netanyahu. He needs a ceasefire in the north to have a free hand in the Gaza Strip. 

Yet the bottom line is that by this escalation, Netanyahu wishes to bring Israel back to the place it was on 6 October. 

As before 7 October, Netanyahu is ready to accept that Hamas will continue to rule Gaza, though weakened after the Israeli invasion and without any international legitimacy. 

As long as this is the case, Israel will not be pushed to negotiate any political agreement with the Palestinians, and blocking such negotiations, let alone any peace deal with the Palestinians has always been Netanyahu’s goal.

In the north, Netanyahu could present a ceasefire with Hezbollah as a victory, even at the price of the lives of Israeli captives in Gaza. Netanyahu’s supporters have already given up on the effort to bring them back alive, and many of those who now go to the streets against Netanyahu with a demand for a “deal now” may settle for a victory over Hezbollah.  

Easier said than done 

The only problem, and this is of course a huge problem, is that Hezbollah is not ready for a ceasefire and continues to fire at Israel at an increasing pace. Most of the Israelis who are now under Hezbollah’s attacks in the north support the Israeli mass bombardments in Lebanon for the time being, but if Hezbollah continues to hit back, the mood may change rather quickly, as they will not get closer to returning home. 

If Hezbollah increases the range of its missiles, many more Israelis will be forced to leave their homes, as happened during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. 

Then there’s the economic situation in Israel, which is deteriorating. Some reports say that international rating agencies will further lower Israel’s credit rating if the war goes on and grows. The treasury ministry announced that growth figures are even worse than expected.

International airlines are now cancelling flights to Israel one after the other, and if the war in Lebanon intensifies, there is zero chance they will resume. 

The sense of siege, already very much present in Israel, will only grow. After the current euphoria from the presumed successes in Lebanon fade away, Netanyahu, the army and the Israeli public may find themselves in the same place they were two weeks ago: in a war that is draining its human and economic resources, with no end in sight and with no clear goals.

And there is another issue. Netanyahu wants to reach the US elections in November without an agreement in Gaza. The current escalation seems to guarantee him this. But if the conflict with Hezbollah deteriorates into a regional war – which Israel prefers to avoid at the moment – American interests may be at risk. 

In this scenario, the Biden administration, despite its reluctance to confront Israel, may be pushed to pressure Israel to stop the war, both in Lebanon and in Gaza. This is a result that Netanyahu will want to avoid.