Potential Pathways of the Israeli War on Lebanon

War on Lebanon: The “euphoria” that has engulfed Netanyahu and his government following the severe strikes received by Hezbollah has prompted the small cabinet (the “kabinett”) to decide on a ground incursion into southern Lebanon. This move aims to impose new equations in the conflict with the party, and perhaps even in the Lebanese political landscape. However, the rapid gains achieved might overlook crucial, solid elements in managing the conflict, which could compel Netanyahu to pay steep prices and lead to yet another “failure.”

Objectives of the Israeli Escalation:

The Israeli occupation aims to achieve the following through its escalation against Hezbollah and Lebanon:

1. 1. Establishing a “displacement for displacement” equation by forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands of Lebanese, especially the popular support base for Hezbollah, in response to Hezbollah causing the displacement of over one hundred thousand Zionist settlers in northern Palestine due to the party’s military engagement in supporting the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli occupation seeks to create a pressuring environment on the party and the Lebanese state that allows for achieving a “return for return” equation, which can only be realized by halting the party’s military involvement in the war and through agreements acceptable to the Israeli side.

1. 1. Isolating the Gaza Strip and extricating the party from the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, thereby stopping the Zionist military, security, economic, and human bleeding in northern Palestine.

1. 1. Attempting to achieve new gains beyond what is stipulated in UN Resolution 1701, such as preventing Hezbollah’s military presence south of the Al-Awali River, disarming the party, and imposing stricter oversight (with international backing) on the party and its activities, especially military ones.

1. 1. Striving to weaken the party and inflict significant losses on its cadres and popular bases, to the extent that it diminishes its influence and political weight in the Lebanese arena, thereby allowing other actors the opportunity to advance and impose a new political equation that better meets Israeli and American demands and standards.

It appears that the “seduction” in which the Israeli occupation finds itself has led it to pursue its “dreams” aggressively, while numerous arrogant statements and threats emerge from the leaders and symbols of the occupation. This comes at a time when Netanyahu has regained his “stardom” in Zionist society and his party has gained in opinion polls following the “achievements” he has made on the Lebanese front.

Potential Scenarios and Pathways:

We seem to be faced with four potential pathways for the Israeli war on Lebanon:

1. 1. Drowning in the Lebanese Quagmire: This scenario assumes a ground invasion, leading to the destruction of much of the Lebanese infrastructure, even if it incurs steep costs. This scenario is based on the premise that the ruling Israeli mentality, having achieved “victories” in recent weeks, and fueled by its sense of “euphoria,” will seek to achieve a clear victory over Hezbollah and impose its terms. In contrast, Hezbollah, due to its ideological nature, the combat readiness of tens of thousands of its cadres, its strong military capabilities, and its significant popular support base—along with the potential for continuous logistical support—remains capable, with its allies, of maintaining effective operations, wearing down the occupation, and exhausting it. This implies that the war may extend (as in Gaza) until Netanyahu withdraws in disgrace or until Israeli opposition forces compel him to resign.

1. 1. Continuation of Calculated Engagement: This involves retreating from the idea of a ground invasion, adjusting the tempo of the war up or down according to field calculations, and utilizing Israeli superiority in airpower, drones, and intelligence, while preventing the return of displaced individuals. Meanwhile, Hezbollah will continue targeting Israeli positions in occupied northern Palestine and even its center. This means a mutual “biting of fingers” and an exhausting process for both sides, awaiting the balance to tip in favor of one side or the other, and looking for developments in Gaza.

1. 1. Strong Israeli Ground Invasion: This scenario aims to achieve “victories” similar to the military and security strikes inflicted on the party and its leadership and cadres. The goal is to impose new equations and achieve the objectives mentioned above. This is the “wishful” scenario for Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, and Smotrich, which assumes that the party has sustained severe blows, even to its weapon caches and infrastructure, and is unable to withstand a prolonged ground battle. This scenario is unlikely because evidence indicates a strong performance by the resistance in thwarting all attempts to breach the border by occupation forces. Additionally, Hezbollah still possesses many times more than it did previously when it forced the occupation to withdraw from southern Lebanon. Furthermore, the military engagement is the “game” that the party excels at, given its human and military capabilities and its precise field knowledge of its territory, which has been thoroughly prepared for such situations.

1. 1. Regional War: This pathway is based on the Israeli side’s understanding that it will not ensure its security in the future unless it “clips the wings” of Iran and its allies in the region and imposes a “normalization state” in the strategic environment surrounding the Israeli entity, ensuring its security and stability. This scenario presumes American backing or drawing the U.S. into the battle alongside the Israeli occupation. It remains a distant scenario for now, although the Israeli occupation is “playing with fire,” which could push it in that direction, especially in light of Israeli discussions about striking the Iranian nuclear project and inflicting severe military and economic blows on Iran. However, Iran and its allies do not desire a regional war; regional powers, as well as the Americans and their Western allies, are also reluctant to become “entangled” in such a war, the outcome and consequences of which cannot be guaranteed.

Conclusions:

Currently, the expected pathways seem to oscillate between the first and second scenarios, with the Israeli occupation perhaps seeking to blend these scenarios through a “wave-like behavior” of escalating and reducing intensity, along with limited and calculated ground incursions to control “soft” areas that it can later integrate into the bargaining process before halting the aggression.

In general, the exhausted and depleted Israeli army, which has failed to achieve its goals in the Gaza Strip after more than 360 days of combat, is unable to provide the human and logistical capacities for a ground invasion of 80,000 to 120,000 soldiers. It is even less capable of controlling areas in southern Lebanon, which are much larger than the Gaza Strip, and its resistance environment is already prepared to deal forcefully and effectively with any incursion and repel it.

Hezbollah remains a doctrinal party, with a broad popular, organizational, and military base, and has made it clear that it still links its cessation of missile strikes to stopping the aggression against the Gaza Strip. It is capable of continuing the war for extended periods, exhausting and depleting the occupation, and expanding its targeting of Israeli sites to amplify the Israeli losses and the number of displaced Zionists. Moreover, the Arab and international environment opposes the expansion of the war and fears its repercussions, which will increase the pressure on the Israeli occupation and heighten its isolation.

Netanyahu may try to “test his luck” in achieving a decisive achievement against Hezbollah by mobilizing his capabilities. However, indicators suggest that if he does, his depletion will accelerate, potentially hastening the collapse of his government and the downfall of the theories and illusions upon which the entity was founded.