Details of the Lebanon Pager Bombing Plan: A “Diabolical” Method for Detonating the Device

A recent report by The Washington Post has revealed what it claims are new details regarding the operation to detonate “pager” communication devices used by Hezbollah members in Lebanon, highlighting years of communication infiltration and espionage against the group.

According to the report, the pager model “ER 924” is among the most powerful devices, designed to withstand combat conditions. Its Taiwanese design is waterproof, and its massive battery can operate for months without needing a recharge. Additionally, it has been fortified against security monitoring and tracking by Israeli intelligence.

The report emphasizes that the initial offers of the new product from Apollo were perfectly suited for the armed group, which has an extensive network of fighters and a strong emphasis on security awareness.

Hezbollah leaders were so impressed with the device that they purchased 5,000 units, beginning distribution to their mid-level members and support personnel in February. None of the recipients suspected they were carrying a bomb designed by Israeli intelligence.

Even after the devices exploded in Lebanon and Syria, only a few members realized the lethal aspect of the pagers: decrypting them required both hands to be pressed on the device to trigger the explosion.

The operation resulted in the deaths and injuries of 3,000 Hezbollah members, mostly among senior leadership in the rear ranks, along with an unknown number of civilians. This occurred when the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, remotely activated the devices on September 17, according to American and Israeli officials.

The report stated that the operation by Israeli intelligence to penetrate the enemy was deemed clever, but the ensuing details and debates within the security establishment began to surface publicly.

Details gathered about the operation were sourced from Israeli, Arab, and American security officials, as well as Lebanese officials and individuals connected to Hezbollah. They indicated that the operation started in Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, involving a team and several accomplices in various countries.

The operation not only failed to dismantle Hezbollah’s leadership but also emboldened the Israeli occupation to consider assassinating the party’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. On Tuesday, Iran retaliated for Nasrallah’s potential assassination by launching 200 ballistic missiles towards Tel Aviv. Ali Khamenei stated during a Friday sermon: “Resistance in the region will not retreat when its leaders are killed.”

The newspaper remarked: “However, the strike convinced Israeli leadership that they could hang Hezbollah from a noose and expose it to systematic dismantling through airstrikes and then a ground invasion.”

 

It noted that “while some officials were pleased with the operation’s success, they remained fearful of the strike’s repercussions on a conflict that is continuously expanding.” An Israeli official stated: “We cannot make a strategic decision to escalate in Lebanon based on a puppet.”

The Post alleged that the plan dates back to 2022, with parts of it halted following Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, necessitating de-escalation on the northern front.

Meanwhile, Mossad monitored Hezbollah and attempted to infiltrate it through electronic surveillance and agent placements. Over time, the party’s leaders became aware of the dangers of electronic devices, including mobile phones that could be turned into spying tools for the occupation.

This concern led to the emergence of the “Trojan Horse for Communications” concept, as stated by one official.

Hezbollah was searching for electronic networks resistant to infiltration for message transmission, while Mossad devised a double scheme that would lead it to purchase devices appearing perfect for this task—equipment designed and assembled by Mossad in Israel.

The first part of the plan involved introducing bomb-laden devices and walkie-talkies into Lebanon nearly a decade ago, in 2015. The two-way portable communication devices contained large battery packs and hidden explosives, along with a transmission system that granted Israel complete access to Hezbollah’s communications.

For nine years, Israelis listened in on Hezbollah, retaining the option to convert the radios into bombs if needed in the future. Then, a new opportunity arose with a sleek product: a small pager equipped with powerful explosives.

In a paradox that only emerged months later, Hezbollah ultimately ended up indirectly paying Israelis for the small bombs that would kill or injure many of its members. Given their awareness of potential sabotage, Hezbollah leaders were cautious about receiving communication devices from Israel, the U.S., or any other ally of Israel.

Thus, in 2023, the group began receiving bulk purchase requests for Apollo-branded communication devices, a well-known Taiwanese brand with a production line distributed worldwide, devoid of any clear connections to Israeli or Jewish interests.

The Taiwanese company was unaware of the plan, as officials state. The purchase offer came from a trusted official within Hezbollah who had connections to Apollo. The identity or nationality of this marketing official was not disclosed. She was previously the company’s representative in the Middle East, later establishing her own firm and obtaining a license to sell the new pager product bearing the Apollo brand.

At some point in 2023, she offered Hezbollah the large “ER 924” pager device. An Israeli official familiar with the details of the operation stated: “She was the one who contacted Hezbollah, explaining that the large pager with the bigger battery was superior to the original model.” The official added that one of the device’s main features was its ability to be charged via a cable and used for an extended period without needing a recharge.

As it later turned out, third parties were engaged to produce the devices, and the marketing entity was unaware of the operation, with the pagers assembled under Mossad’s supervision in Israel, according to officials knowledgeable about the conspiracy.

The pagers assembled by Mossad, each weighing three ounces, included an essential feature: a battery concealing a small quantity of explosives. The explosives were concealed in a way that would remain undetectable even if disassembled.

Israeli officials believe that Hezbollah may have disassembled some of them and scanned a number with X-rays. The devices contained an invisible outlet, allowing an electronic signal from Mossad to detonate thousands of pagers simultaneously. To ensure maximum damage, the user needed to activate an encrypted message on the device.

One official remarked: “You had to press two buttons to read the message.” In practice, this meant using both hands, making it almost certain that the ensuing explosion would strike both hands, rendering them incapable of fighting.

As of September 12, senior political officials were unaware of this lethal possibility. On that day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called his security advisors for a meeting to discuss a potential attack against Hezbollah. A summary of the meeting held weeks later indicated that Mossad officials presented an initial glimpse into one of the agency’s most secretive operations. By that time, the Israelis had placed bomb-laden communication devices in the hands and pockets of thousands of Hezbollah members, according to officials knowledgeable about the matter.

Security officials expressed concerns about the trick being discovered, as signs of escalation with Hezbollah began to appear, threatening to render years of planning futile. Consequently, a heated discussion ensued among Israeli officials, with Netanyahu debating the possibility of a retaliation from Hezbollah and surviving members with rockets against Israel.

An Israeli official commented: “The risks were evident.” Officials from the Ministry of Defense warned against a comprehensive confrontation with Hezbollah at a time when the military continued operations in Gaza. However, officials in Mossad saw an opportunity to alter the status quo. Throughout this discussion, the United States, Israel’s closest ally, was not informed about the bomb-laden pagers or the internal debate regarding their detonation.

Ultimately, Netanyahu approved the detonation of the devices when they could inflict the maximum damage. Over the following week, Mossad began preparations to detonate the pagers, along with walkie-talkies that were already in circulation.

The newspaper stated that Mossad was aware of the location of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, closely tracking his movements, as officials reported.

However, the Israelis refrained from bombing him, convinced that an assassination would lead to an all-out war with the armed group, and possibly with Iran as well. American diplomats were pressuring Nasrallah to agree to a separate ceasefire with Israel, hoping for an arrangement that would lead to the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters from southern Lebanese bases near the Israeli border.

Israeli officials remained uncertain about targeting Nasrallah. Amid the internal debate over whether to target the party leader, on September 17, Apollo-branded pagers began emitting single pings in Lebanon and Syria.

Each device displayed the message: “You have received an encrypted message.” Hezbollah members meticulously followed the instructions to check the encrypted messages by pressing two buttons.

In homes, shops, cars, and on sidewalks, explosions tore apart hands and severed fingers. Within less than a minute, thousands more pagers exploded remotely, regardless of whether the user had touched their device.

The following day, on September 18, hundreds of walkie-talkies detonated in the same manner, resulting in fatalities and injuries among users and bystanders. This marked the beginning of a fierce Israeli campaign against Hezbollah, culminating in the assassination of party leader Nasrallah on September 27.