How the Occupation Violated Normalization Agreements and Exposed the Arab Regimes

The Israeli genocidal war against the Gaza Strip has completed a full year, during which numerous efforts to secure a ceasefire or even a broad prisoner exchange deal have failed, despite American initiatives and Arab mediations led primarily by Qatar and Egypt.

Although Qatar announced that it would not normalize relations with “Israel” until a permanent and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue is reached, many countries that have normalized their relations, both historically and recently, have also failed to halt the war or even pressure “Israel” to meet essential humanitarian demands related to assistance for the population and the displaced within Gaza.

The failure of normalization agreements to achieve any significant results regarding negotiations and pressure on “Israel” has extended to the occupation openly violating many of their terms, seemingly without fear of repercussions.

Egypt

Egypt has witnessed over 45 years of normalization since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979, following the Camp David Accords of 1978, which included many annexes and protocols detailing the presence, number, and armament of military forces, as well as other specifics regarding the borders between “Israel” and Egypt.

At the time of the agreement, “Israel” controlled all borders of the Gaza Strip, including a 14-kilometer stretch along the border between Gaza and Egypt, which later became known as the Salah al-Din Axis or the Philadelphi Route (according to the Hebrew pronunciation).

Following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, termed “unilateral disengagement” in Israeli nomenclature, the Philadelphi Agreement was signed and attached to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty to regulate the borders between Gaza and Egypt.

The Salah al-Din Axis is a buffer zone measuring 14 kilometers in length and 100 meters in width, established according to the terms of the Camp David Accords signed by Egypt and “Israel” in September 1978. Its purpose was “to prevent any armed infiltration and control the movement of Palestinians and the smuggling of weapons between Egyptian Sinai and the Gaza Strip, in both directions.”

This axis, bordered by barbed wire fences ranging from two to three meters high and numerous concrete blocks, remained under occupation control until the unilateral withdrawal of the army from Gaza in 2005, by a decision from then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

The Philadelphi Agreement stipulated the deployment of a unit of 750 Egyptian border guards along the buffer zone on the Egyptian side, marking the first time Egyptian soldiers patrolled this area since the 1967 War, when “Israel” occupied Gaza, then administered by Egypt, and the Sinai Peninsula.

The agreement went so far as to precisely define the equipment of the Egyptian unit, which included 8 helicopters, 30 light armored vehicles, and 4 speedboats. “Israel” announced that it would evacuate the Gaza Strip, including “all existing Israeli cities and villages,” and would redeploy outside the sector, with this military deployment not including the border area between Gaza and Egypt.

On the other side of the axis, the Palestinian Authority’s security forces were responsible for security before being expelled two years later in June 2007 due to the Palestinian divide and Hamas’s complete control of Gaza.

Breaching the Agreement

With the outbreak of war on the Gaza Strip in October 2023, attention shifted once again to the axis, seen more than ever as a “strategic axis for Hamas,” and was regularly targeted by the occupation’s army. Netanyahu stated, “The Philadelphi Axis must be in our hands and under our control; any other arrangement will not be accepted by Israel.”

Egypt opposed any military action that might occur in the city of Rafah in southern Gaza from the outset of the war, while the Egyptian regime denied on multiple occasions any agreement with the occupation to arrange for an invasion of Rafah.

Among the most notable statements was that of Egyptian Information Authority head Diaa Rashwan, who warned against “violating the peace treaty” that binds the two countries if the Israeli army entered the Philadelphi Axis.

In January 2024, Rashwan issued a “stern warning” that Egypt considers the reoccupation of this axis a red line that cannot be crossed, in addition to the resulting displacement of Palestinian residents, stating, “Egypt has informed Israel through diplomatic channels and the United States that Cairo will never allow this option.”

Despite this, on May 7, 2024, the occupation army seized control of the Rafah land crossing connecting Gaza and Egypt, a day after Tel Aviv announced the start of military operations in the overcrowded city of Rafah, ignoring international warnings about the consequences.

On the 29th of the same month, an Israeli military official announced that “Israeli forces have achieved complete operational control over the Philadelphi Axis between Gaza and Egypt.”

The Preface

The 1979 peace treaty outlined a series of obligations for both parties to avoid conflict and ensure “mutual security.” The treaty was intended to “serve as a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and all its other Arab neighbors willing to negotiate peace on this basis.”

Article 3, paragraph two of the peace agreement explicitly commits both parties to “ensure that acts of war or hostility or violence do not arise from their territories nor are committed from them,” obliging both parties to hold accountable any perpetrator of such acts.

Since the Palestinian divide in 2007, the Rafah crossing controlled by Egypt, through which people, goods, and humanitarian aid pass, has only opened sporadically. After the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, the Egyptian army began demolishing hundreds of tunnels under the border with Gaza, and in 2015, Egypt deliberately flooded them with water while continuing to close the crossing, opening it only on a few days throughout the year.

Despite this, Israeli accusations against Egypt emerged, claiming that it violated the peace treaty and placed it at risk, asserting that “dozens of tunnels dug by Hamas—some of which are enormous—have raised questions about Egypt’s commitment to the agreement, which resulted in Cairo receiving billions of dollars from American taxpayers,” according to Newsweek magazine.

The tunnels, which extend from Gaza to the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, are believed to have served as military supply lines for Hamas. In addition to facilitating the import of hard currency to pay the salaries of Hamas’s military personnel, the tunnels allowed the group’s leaders and fighters to rotate in and out of the enclave for training and guidance from their sponsors, according to the magazine.

After the Israeli army announced finding dozens of tunnels in the Salah al-Din “Philadelphi” area extending along the border between Gaza and Egypt, a high-ranking Egyptian source emerged to deny and respond to this news.

The source emphasized to “Cairo News” that what is being circulated is a form of “Israel’s escape from its failures in Gaza,” asserting that “Israel’s failure to achieve success in Gaza drives it to spread claims about the existence of tunnels to justify the continuation of its aggression on the sector.”

The source also confirmed that “Israel has not provided evidence of operational tunnels along the sector’s borders and is exploiting closed tunnels in Gaza to disseminate misleading claims for political purposes.”

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel-Ati stated that “Israeli statements regarding weapons smuggling into Gaza through the Philadelphi Axis are mere fabrications and lies aimed at diverting attention from the issue of reaching a deal that ensures an immediate ceasefire in the besieged sector.”

He added during a joint press conference with his Danish counterpart that “Egypt has invested huge financial amounts over the past 10 years to establish a security fence along the border and ensure the complete destruction of all tunnels that existed from the other side of the border.”

Jordan

The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, known as the “Wadi Araba Treaty,” was signed on October 26, 1994, along the border separating the two parties and passing through Wadi Araba. Under this treaty, relations between the two countries were normalized, addressing their border disputes.

This treaty is directly linked to the efforts made in the “peace process” with the occupation, making Jordan the second Arab country after Egypt to officially normalize relations with the Israeli occupation.

Article 9 of the treaty regarding places of historical and religious significance includes three main points: First, each party will grant the other freedom to access places of religious and historical significance; second, in line with the Washington Declaration, “Israel” respects the current special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, and during final status negotiations, “Israel” will prioritize the historic Jordanian role in these sites.

The third point is that both parties will work together to promote dialogue among the three monotheistic religions to build religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of worship, tolerance, and peace.

Custodianship

Jordan is the only authority authorized to manage, renovate, and restore the mosque, allowing or denying access and regulating the conduct of individuals within it, as it “exercises its responsibility towards the holy sites in Jerusalem based on the historical Hashemite custodianship,” according to the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

The ministry emphasizes that “Jerusalem has remained a top priority for Sharif Hussein bin Ali (1853-1931), and Hashemite care for the holy sites became established when he was sworn in as custodian by the people of Palestine in 1924. He was the first to donate for the reconstruction of Al-Aqsa Mosque, initiating with his son Prince Abdullah (1882-1951) to provide an amount equivalent to about 50,000 gold liras for the restoration of the pure holy sites, which was termed the First Hashemite Reconstruction.”

The Israeli occupation seeks to impose temporal and spatial division on the Noble Al-Aqsa Mosque. Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir conducts provocative tours periodically to change the status quo at the mosque, which has fueled resentment among Palestinians, especially since the occupation army has not only demolished homes but has also attacked churches, mosques, and Islamic religious sites.

The occupation claims to have established Jewish settlements in Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem to bolster its presence, which has always prompted Jordan to intervene and reject these violations, considering them a direct assault on the Hashemite custodianship of the holy sites and a blatant violation of the peace treaty signed in 1994.

Jordan has repeatedly warned against these practices, emphasizing that it will “not stand idly by” in the face of Israeli provocations.

The Role of the Gulf States

Although relations between the Gulf states and “Israel” are still being defined, their normalization has encountered issues. The UAE has maintained a position of promoting peace and stability in the region while denouncing the occupation’s violations against Palestinians.

In the aftermath of the October 2023 war, Emirati Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed stated, “The violence against the Palestinian people has exacerbated the situation,” emphasizing that “peace in the region cannot be achieved without the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

In Saudi Arabia, where “Israel” is looking to normalize relations, the Kingdom has not officially declared its intentions regarding normalization after the war. It has repeatedly called for a ceasefire and respected Palestinian rights, prompting some Israeli officials to complain that relations with Saudi Arabia were “cut off due to the Gaza war.”

Despite their normalization agreements with “Israel,” these states have remained unable to leverage their relations to influence the occupation’s policies or respond to the Palestinian plight.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the normalization agreements between Arab states and the Israeli occupation have proven ineffective in achieving their intended claims of peace and security. Instead, they have allowed the occupation to disregard the rights of Palestinians and violate the terms of these agreements with impunity.

As the situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate, it becomes increasingly clear that true normalization can only be achieved through a commitment to justice and the recognition of Palestinian rights, rather than through agreements that prioritize political expediency over genuine peace.