Israeli General Outlines 3 Pillars for the Day After Ending the Regional War

Amid increasing calls within Israel for a political end to the ongoing war, following what it claims as “military achievements” on multiple fronts, there is a growing push for a coordinated political effort to establish a new regional order. This initiative comes as the Israeli occupation continues its destructive military operations, primarily targeting the northern and southern fronts.

General Amit Yagur, former Deputy Chief of Field Operations in the Planning Division of the Israeli Army and head of the Northern Field in Naval Intelligence, stated that alongside the military activities—especially the recent assassinations in Gaza and Lebanon—there must be a concerted political effort on all fronts, even under the cover of ongoing fire. He emphasized that the military operations across all fronts would continue to support and influence this political effort. Yagur highlighted three main axes that must be addressed simultaneously: the issue of the captives, the establishment of a new regional order in the Middle East, and the Iranian dossier.

In a detailed article published by “Maariv” and translated by “Arabi21,” Yagur explained that the first axis concerns the captives in Gaza, which he described as the main and most crucial effort. He suggested changing the term “deal,” which has been used for the past year, as it no longer reflects the changes witnessed in the war over the recent weeks and months. The focus should shift to ensuring the personal survival of the captives, especially following the assassination of Yahya Sinwar. This, he claimed, implies that there will be a more flexible approach, concentrating efforts on preserving the remaining Hamas leaders in Gaza to manage the “day after,” whether they stay in Gaza or make a tactical exit with the intention of returning later.

Yagur pointed out that the second axis revolves around establishing a new regional order in the Middle East. The occupation envisions a transitional period of about a year to design this system, during which the Israeli army will establish a thick buffer zone between its settlements and the other side, which will remain under the current status quo, whether in Gaza or Lebanon. The plan includes maintaining control over some adversary territories as buffer zones where the Israeli army would be stationed, excluding the United Nations from any “day after” arrangements, as he claims it is part of the problem rather than the solution. This policy extends to UNRWA in Gaza and UNIFIL in Lebanon.

He asserted that this new regional order would, for the first time, seek a peace agreement with Lebanon to be concluded at the end of the transitional period. This is a clear message that would be difficult to retract, coordinated with the United States and bolstered by the active participation of normalization countries, with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia. These nations would be engaged in ground enforcement and control efforts in Gaza and Lebanon. Yagur stressed that Syria should also be included in any new regional order, with a firm stance on removing Iranian forces from its territory.

The writer further called for integrating global economic factors into this new order, highlighting the region’s vast potential. Some ideas have already been drafted in the United States, particularly within the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and major international corporations. Discussions have already begun about reconstruction efforts in Gaza and Lebanon, with Israel expected to actively participate in this process. This would involve dialogue with the United States and financial agencies concerning the scope and limits of reconstruction, ensuring the exclusion of any entity with ties to Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas.

Yagur clarified that the third axis addresses the entire Iranian file, noting that for the first time, Iran stands directly against Israel, which now has international legitimacy to respond to Iran. He claimed that Iran’s allies are experiencing military, leadership, and political setbacks, creating a strategic environment that may not recur soon. Although Iran might attempt to recover in the coming years, this situation presents an opportunity to detach Iran from the new regional order and weaken it by fostering internal social issues. The goal is to significantly weaken Iran as a driving force, compelling it to focus inward within its borders for the coming years, paving the way for establishing the roots of the new regional order.