UAE and the Strategy of Full-Scale Normalization and Relations with Israel

A prominent analytical article highlights the United Arab Emirates’ strategy of fully betting on normalization and networking relations with Israel amid the ongoing Israeli war in Gaza and Lebanon for over a year.

The article, published by the Gulf House Center for Studies and Publishing, states that Gulf diplomacy does not exert any real pressure on Washington to end the Israeli war.

It is mentioned that although this claim remains a hypothesis that needs confirmation, the media content of some Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, confirms that these countries see in this war an opportunity not to be missed to weaken, and perhaps eliminate, what the Gulf states consider Iran’s influential arms in the region, especially the Lebanese Hezbollah.

The contrast between the political stances issued by the foreign ministries and the government statements and the content of both governmental and private media in these countries, notably Al Arabiya and Sky News Arabia, indicates that there is a narrative being focused on. This narrative attributes the responsibility for what is happening to the resistance axis led by Iran.

This narrative considers that “these unrestrained organizations and their resort to military action have been and still are the reason for complicating the scene and exposing thousands of Palestinians to killing and displacement. Moreover, these militias obstruct, procedurally, the two-state solution that the Gulf countries see possible through the window of Gulf-Israeli normalization.”

Despite the commonalities shared by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, it is possible to note points of divergence and observe them; Riyadh appears more cautious regarding the normalization file with Israel and more inclined to receive the prices of any political deal upfront, which does not align with Abu Dhabi’s bet on taking an early leap in the normalization file and networking relations with Tel Aviv.

The file of normalizing relations between the Gulf countries and Israel emerged, considering the latter as an alternative that could compensate for the United States’ exit from the region and its eastward shift towards Russia and China.

On the ground, the United States still maintains its military bases in all Gulf countries, and this claim loses much of its validity, considering the Gulf countries’ keen efforts to sign more defense agreements with Washington and to correct their relations with Iran.

This is particularly evident through the Gulf states’ clear announcement in recent days that they will not allow the use of any of their military bases or airspace in directing any Israeli or American military strike on Iran.

Historically, before Britain entered the Gulf in 1820, the Gulf states, then weak sheikhdoms, managed their relations with Iran for about two centuries.

What is becoming more apparent today than ever is that Israel’s entry into the Gulf does not guarantee the security of its states against Iran as much as it complicates the scene. Transforming the cities and ports of the Arab Gulf states into Israeli platforms or a theater for Mossad operations and Tehran-Tel Aviv conflicts exposes the security of these countries to further risks.

Referring back to the war scene in Gaza and Lebanon, assuming that the trio, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, is pragmatically exploiting Israel’s elimination of Iran’s arms; Hamas and Hezbollah, it is found that Israel’s emergence from this war with a resounding victory does not involve any interest for the Gulf states.

Israel’s exit from this war while being secure internally and on its borders completely liberates it from discussing the two-state solution, let alone accepting it. Moreover, it frees Washington from the need to pressure Tel Aviv to make any concessions for normalizing relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. Therefore, the basket of incentives that Riyadh conditioned for normalizing its relations with Tel Aviv has ended.

According to the article, the Gulf countries lack a strategy or vision that organizes their political stances, diplomatic efforts, and media rhetoric towards the Israeli war on Gaza and Lebanon, which indicates that the differences in visions and political divergences among the Council countries are still active.

The Gulf states’ retreat from playing a politically and diplomatically influential role in the crisis could limit their future roles and make them hostages to the voids left by both Israel and Iran, which could lead to a decline in their influence.

The article concludes that normalizing relations with Israel has not granted the Gulf states any advantage in influencing Israeli policies in the war, nor has it enabled Israel to benefit from the Gulf states in its conflict with Iran.