Why Has the Syrian Regime Stayed Out of War on Gaza & Lebanon

The American magazine Foreign Policy published a report by foreign policy correspondent Anchal Vohra, questioning why the Syrian regime has refrained from entering the ongoing regional conflict.

In her report, analysed by “Sunna Files Website” Vohra argues that Syria’s exploitation of the Palestinian cause is one of its most apparent “open secrets.” At the onset of Israel’s offensive on Gaza in early October, some wondered if Syria would join the conflict against Israel and open a new front.

However, Vohra notes, no one in Syria believed that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would become involved, particularly on behalf of Hamas.

The American report cites former Syrian diplomat Bassam Barbandi, who said, “The government portrays itself as if it’s resisting Israel, but that has always been a lie. Both Bashar and his father before him had a silent agreement to keep the border with Israel calm. That’s why Syria won’t get involved in Gaza.”

This sentiment has resonated with both Syrians and Palestinians, as the report explains. In past Gaza conflicts, the Syrian government encouraged large demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinian people. However, protests this time were minor, and support for the resistance was muted.

Barbandi added, “The government didn’t allow major protests against Israel, nor did it permit any calls for solidarity with comrades in the resistance axis,” interpreting this as “a sign that Syria not only wishes to stay out of the conflict but also wants to be clearly seen as uninvolved.”

Despite Israel’s repeated airstrikes on Syria and its declared commitment to supporting the Palestinian people, the Syrian regime has largely remained a spectator to the conflict that erupted in Gaza over a year ago.

Experts and analysts say Assad’s top priority is ensuring his regime’s survival and maintaining control over the Syrian populace. Despite his crackdown on internal opposition, 40% of Syrian territory remains beyond government control, according to the report.

A Western diplomat, quoted by Agence France-Presse, noted that Israel warned Assad it would dismantle his regime if Syria acted against it. The report mentions that while there’s no confirmed verification, Israel allegedly targeted the home of Assad’s brother.

Former Israeli National Security Advisor Eran Lerman remarked, “If Assad makes the mistake of actively joining the resistance axis, the consequences will be swift.” He added, “At the moment, I think Assad is hesitant to get involved, and though the Syrian government champions Arab nationalism, Palestine ranks low on its list of priorities. At the top is survival.”

Vohra’s report suggests that Assad hopes his restraint will be rewarded by the West in the form of eased sanctions. She mentions his alignment with the UAE, which has played a crucial role in rehabilitating the Syrian government’s international standing.

Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation against the occupied Palestinian territories, the UAE reportedly advised Assad against engaging in the war, according to Axios.

Another factor is Assad’s strained relationship with Hamas, as he has yet to fully reconcile with the Palestinian movement, which sided with Syria’s armed opposition after the 2011 uprising. Syria’s condolences were minimal after the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, despite a reconciliation in 2022.

In a 2022 interview, Assad noted that it was “too soon” to return to the pre-crisis relationship with Hamas. He added that this sentiment extended to Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which Syria hopes will fund its reconstruction.

According to Foreign Policy, Assad aims to gain goodwill with Western nations, especially as calls grow within Europe for the repatriation of Syrian refugees. Eight European nations, led by Italy, are seeking cooperation with Damascus to facilitate the return of Syrians.

The European Commission is reportedly considering appointing a new special envoy to Syria. Assad’s readmittance into the Arab League and the welcome he received from almost every regional state except Qatar has bolstered his standing.

Vohra explains that while Assad cannot expel Iran from Syria due to its support during Syria’s civil war, Israel operates freely within Syrian airspace, targeting Iranian assets and killing Iranian generals on Syrian soil.

Eran Lerman states, “We have an understanding with Russia that allows us to carry out necessary actions within Syrian airspace.” Reports indicate that Iran has withdrawn some forces from southern Syria, which is a significant base for its proxy groups, especially Hezbollah.

In response to growing losses, Russia established military positions following the assassination of Iranian generals in Syria in April, which raised concerns that the conflict could spread from Gaza into Syrian territory.

Barbandi noted that “Russia might overlook Israeli strikes on southern Syria, even if they violate Syrian airspace.” He added that Russia’s military presence on the frontline near Israel could be a signal that “Assad does not control Hezbollah’s actions on the Golan Heights and that the Syrian army won’t intervene.”

Further, clearing Hezbollah from the southern Golan aligns with Israel’s and Russia’s interests, as it weakens Iran. Once Israel’s objectives are met, Russia may act as a guarantor for Israel to leave Syrian soil.

Assad has positioned himself so that both Iran and Hezbollah have a pretext to stay out of the war. Before his death, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah granted Assad an excuse, saying in a speech in November, “We cannot expect more from Syria. We must be realistic, as the country has been at war for 12 years. Despite its hardships, it continues to support the resistance and bears the consequences.”

For now, Syria remains outside the conflict, careful not to provoke Israel while appeasing Iran by allowing arms transfers to Hezbollah within its borders.

Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, explains, “Assad continues to assist Hezbollah in transporting arms from Iran to Lebanon.” He adds, “This is why Israel targets Syria, destroying missile factories, killing Iranian generals, and attacking arms convoys.”

The magazine concludes that Syria’s absence from the current conflict reveals the limitations of Iran’s “unified front” strategy, which assumes a coordinated response from all resistance axis partners. It also demonstrates that Assad prioritizes political survival over ideological commitments, suggesting Syria, in its current state, poses no threat to Israel.