Why Assad’s downfall should make the region’s other autocrats nervous

Fourteen years after the start of the Syrian uprising and after 13 years of a devastating civil war, the Assad government collapsed in a matter of days.

Images and videos of prisoners, including children, being released from what can only be described as medieval dungeons, flooded social media as Syrians celebrated their newfound freedom and a future that, for the first time in decades, looked free from the brutality of the rule of the Assad family.

However, some lessons can be learned from the rapid collapse of one of the most brutal regimes in the history of the Middle East, whose desire to remain in power at any cost not only destroyed Syria, but also planted the seeds of its own collapse.

The most obvious lesson is the mistake of heavily relying on external support from foreign sponsors, and the belief such support is endless and that these regimes are too important or “too big to fail”.

This is obvious in the case of Bashar al-Assad, who received abundant support from Iran, and his confidence in being indispensable as part of the “axis of resistance” opened up the way to hubris.

For example, Iran invested an estimated $30bn-$50bn over the past 13 years in supporting Assad, or 7.5-12.5 percent of its GDP as of 2023, a massive amount of money for a country under sanctions.

This huge investment also had a human cost, which saw several top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders killed in Syria, mostly targeted by Israel, and at least 1,000 Iranian troops killed by 2016, rising to 2,300 Iranian troops killed by 2019.

These large investments created an illusion of indispensability, as Assad, thinking that his position was secure, attempted to distance himself from Iran and reintegrate himself into the Arab fold, calculating that billions from the Gulf would flow into Syria and his pockets under the guise of “reconstruction”.

Indeed, Assad went to great lengths to avoid taking an active part in the confrontation between Iran and Israel, even when high-level Iranian commanders were being assassinated on Syrian soil, with Iranian concerns that intelligence leaks from the Syrian security apparatus were compromising the safety of IRGC commanders in Syria.

This was a fatal miscalculation, with Iran declining to provide additional military support as the Syrian army rapidly collapsed.

No compromise

External support is neither endless nor unconditional – even when preceded by years of heavy investment – especially when your patrons are facing their own challenges.

Indeed, as the Assad government continued to rely on lavish external support, its patrons were facing mounting geopolitical challenges, which constrained their ability to support their feeble ally.

For example, Russia was entangled in Ukraine. This became apparent when Russia failed to respond forcefully to the fall of Aleppo as it had deployed most of its air force to Ukraine, making Syria a secondary theatre at best. 

The second lesson is that a lack of reform can prove your demise. Arguably, after the fall of Aleppo to the regime and its allies in December 2016, the tide of the civil war had shifted decisively in Assad’s favour.

This was followed by the surrender of rebel forces in Daraa in the south and Eastern Ghouta in Damascus after a siege and heavy shelling by the regime and its allies in 2018.

Assad’s grip on power seemed secure, and the time for starting a political process on its own terms seemed optimal. However, he moved away from any form of compromise, nor did he consider starting a political process that would co-opt the opposition.

The heavy reliance on repression continued to be the norm. This included property confiscation, widespread home demolitions, torture and arbitrary detention of thousands, including continued breaches of the de-escalation agreement in Idlib.

This obstinacy was coupled with continued rebuffs by Assad of attempts to normalise relations with Turkey, mediated by Russia. 

The inability of the Syrian government to compromise with the opposition and its international rivals from a position of strength paved the way for its downfall. Indeed, one can plausibly argue that if Assad had normalised relations with Ankara, it would have been more difficult for the opposition to launch its offensive without tacit Turkish support and approval.

On the other hand, if Assad had initiated a political process and had not pushed the opposition into a corner, then the offensive that brought him down would have been less likely.  

Narco state

Obstinacy and entitlement are the two pillars of Assad’s downfall, and are closely connected to probably the most critical reason that led to the collapse of the government – namely the loss of support among the regime’s core.

Without a consensus that a regime has something of value to offer its base, it will struggle to maintain support. Assad clearly failed to do this. 

For example, by the time of his government’s collapse, 90 percent of Syrians were living below the poverty line, with inflation reaching 120 percent in April 2024 and a collapsed currency and an economy in shambles. Syrian GDP shrank from an estimated $67bn in 2011 to $8.9bn in 2021.

Assad’s solution seemed to revolve around turning Syria into a narco state, a centre for the manufacture and export of Captagon, an industry worth $5.7bn in 2021.  

In other words, Assad decided to sacrifice the fabric of the country’s economic life to stay in power. In the end, what the regime offered was continued death in an endless war and a life of misery and poverty.

This extended to the Syrian army, the power guarantor of the regime, whose members were paid dismally, making rampant corruption a necessity for survival. This spelt the end of the military as an effective fighting force, opening up the way for its rapid collapse.

Who’s next?

These lessons will likely go unheeded by other autocratic governments in the region and their patrons, even when there are painfully clear similarities between them and Assad.

The most obvious example is Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who also presides over a country heavily dependent on external financial support, is extremely resistant to reform, reliant on mass repression, and offers little in terms of economic improvements for the mass of the population – including his support base.

But there are significant differences between Syria and Egypt that make this scenario unlikely. These include the weakness of the Egyptian opposition, the substantial level of popular support that Sisi’s government enjoys and the institutional autonomy of the military, which is a significant barrier to the prospect of democratic transition.

Unlike Syria, Egypt has also been spared the ravages of a brutal civil war, a prelude to the collapse of the Syrian military.

However, just like Assad, Sisi has similar structural vulnerabilities which, if the geopolitical tides shift, might weaken him significantly.

What Assad has shown is that no one is too important, big or strategic to fail, even after billions of dollars’ worth of investments by foreign patrons.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Sunna Files Website.