British Documents Reveal Plan to Topple Hamas Before Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza

The conspiracy to eliminate the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, did not begin with its historic victory in the 2006 elections. It was already in motion on the ground more than a year and a half before the Israeli occupation forces withdrew from the Gaza Strip.

British documents obtained by Sunna Files Website reveal that as early as 2004, Britain devised a “four-track plan” to prevent Hamas from achieving any victories across the occupied Palestinian territories and to thwart any efforts to resist the Israeli occupation.

Declassified records from the British Prime Minister’s Office show that the price the United States paid to Israel for withdrawing its forces from Gaza—under what the late Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon called the unilateral disengagement plan—angered officials in former U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration. One official even complained that Sharon had “stripped the Americans bare.”

A Coordinated Conspiracy

In early 2004, Britain began implementing a plan in collaboration with the United States and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza. Details of the plan emerged in preparation for a visit by then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair to the United States and his meeting with Bush in April of that year. The Middle East peace process was among the top priorities on their agenda.

As part of the plan, a “operations room” was established in Ramallah, in the occupied West Bank. Its mission was to “gather intelligence and use it to neutralize potential threats.” The primary objective was to cut off all support for Palestinian resistance groups, particularly Hamas, in both the West Bank and Gaza, and to thwart any efforts that might encourage Palestinians to engage in resistance against the Israeli occupation.

The Ramallah operations room employed 60 officers from various Palestinian security agencies. These officers were divided into five specialized units tasked with addressing the following challenges: suicide attacks, arms smuggling, illegal funding, unlawful possession of weapons, and incitement (referring to Palestinian calls for resistance against the occupation).

Extending the Plan to Gaza

A report prepared by Blair’s advisory team in anticipation of his meeting with Bush revealed that Britain had also established a “central operations room” in Gaza, modeled after the one in Ramallah. This Gaza-based unit included security forces under the control of the Israeli occupation army. The report noted that these forces were “looking to Egypt to play a role” in implementing the plan.

Britain’s role was not limited to planning; it also contributed a “police advisory mission,” funded by the UK’s Department for International Development (now part of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office). The documents show that this mission began operations on April 12, 2004—nearly a year and a half before Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza—with the deployment of “54 police vehicles provided by the ministry.”

The British government ensured that Blair would inform Bush of the progress of the plan and emphasize its purpose: “to support the Palestinian Authority (PA)” by enabling it to effectively control Gaza post-withdrawal, thereby preventing Hamas from achieving any victories. Blair was advised to assure Bush that the UK was “accelerating our security efforts” and encouraging “more dialogue between the U.S., UK, and Egypt” regarding the security plan to block Hamas’s success.

Reports indicate that British officials were satisfied with the initial outcomes on the ground. According to their assessments, the security plan had achieved “early successes,” such as discovering two weapons and explosives caches in Bethlehem, including materials for an explosive belt.

The Broader Context

At the time, the Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada), which erupted in 2000 following Sharon’s provocative visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque under Israeli military protection, was intensifying. In response to the Intifada and the mounting losses suffered by Israeli occupation forces, Britain and the U.S. sought to activate the role of the international Quartet (formed in 2002) to facilitate peace negotiations and assist Palestinians in building institutions in preparation for their promised state under the two-state solution framework.

The British documents reveal that the security plan was part of a broader “four-track” strategy aimed at empowering the PA against Hamas. This strategy included economic support, reform initiatives, political engagement, and security cooperation among Egypt, the U.S., and the UK, within a framework designed to strengthen the PA.

Economically, the British project sought to “maximize aid and channel it to the PA” through a “Palestine Trust Fund,” funded by the World Bank and a committee that included the international Quartet, Canada, Japan, Norway, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The goal was to “build Palestinian institutional capacity.” However, Britain insisted that any aid provided to the PA be conditional on “enhancing reforms.”

Under the plan, seven reform support groups were proposed to address areas such as civil society, elections, financial accountability, judicial reform and rule of law, market economics, local governance, and ministry and civil service reform.

Politically, the focus was on strengthening the Quartet as a “mechanism for international oversight” of the peace process and determining the nature of international contributions. The British tasked Quartet envoys with assessing the need for adjustments or reinforcements to the process.

The security track received significant British attention, with efforts to involve Egypt as a “key and active player” alongside the U.S. and UK. Blair’s advisory team, led by Sir Nigel Sheinwald, his foreign policy and defense advisor, proposed “building on the security work” Britain was already undertaking in Gaza and the West Bank. The goal was to “establish a robust partnership among the UK, U.S., and Egypt to support the PA’s serious security efforts on the ground.”

Sharon’s Unilateral Disengagement

While British officials were busy organizing files ahead of the Blair-Bush summit on April 16, 2004, Bush surprised stakeholders by offering major concessions to Sharon during their White House meeting. Sharon presented his unilateral disengagement plan for Gaza, citing the rising death toll among Israeli soldiers guarding illegal settlements established after the 1967 war. He also proposed withdrawing from four settlements in the northern West Bank.

In return, Bush rejected UN resolutions on the right of return for Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 and beyond. He also endorsed Sharon’s plan to retain settlements in the West Bank in any final agreement. Bush urged Palestinians and Arabs to acknowledge the “realities on the ground,” effectively abandoning the internationally recognized principle of Israel’s withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders.

Internal Dissent in the U.S.

The British-American communications about the Bush-Sharon summit revealed dissatisfaction within the U.S. administration over the concessions granted to Israel. Richard Armitage, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, told British Ambassador Sir David Manning that there was “no need for Bush to make concessions on borders or the right of return.”

In a private discussion, Armitage expressed frustration, saying, “Sharon stripped us bare.” While acknowledging the rationale behind Bush’s statements, he questioned the timing, asking, “Why give up these cards now?” According to Manning’s report, Armitage appeared visibly angry and described the situation as having “a bad effect on Condi” (Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Advisor), who, though hiding her emotions, “became visibly tense.”

The Aftermath

In late August 2005, Israel completed its withdrawal from Gaza. In January 2006, Hamas won the elections, which international organizations and the EU hailed as the first truly fair and democratic Palestinian elections—a historic turning point. However, the U.S., Israel, and the EU labeled Hamas a terrorist organization, cutting aid to the Palestinian people.

Subsequent efforts by Fatah, led by Mahmoud Abbas, with the backing of Israel, the U.S., and regional actors, to overthrow Hamas failed. In June 2007, Hamas consolidated its control over Gaza, which has since been subjected to a devastating and comprehensive blockade that continues to this day.