Trump Won’t Destroy the World Order… Because It’s Already Dead!

In an article for Foreign Affairs, political scientists Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon examine the claim that former President Donald Trump’s return to the White House could deal a severe blow to the so-called “liberal international order.” They argue that Trump’s disdain for key global institutions—such as NATO, the UN, and the World Trade Organization—threatens to unravel an international system Washington once built to cement its dominance. Yet the authors contend this system is already under serious strain, even before Trump’s second term begins.

The Liberal Order in Crisis

The “liberal international order” generally refers to a network of international institutions and treaties—like the United Nations and NATO—that the United States led in creating in the post–World War II era. These institutions ostensibly promoted human rights, free trade, democracy, and multilateral collaboration. After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Washington and its allies expanded and reframed this system, spurring a wave of democratization, the establishment of the WTO, and a global push for unrestricted trade and capital flows.

However, for over a decade, China and Russia have been developing their own frameworks for global governance. Sometimes, they directly challenge the human rights norms championed by the West (e.g., at the UN), or they compete indirectly by offering economic and security partnerships that do not hinge on democratic reforms or anti-corruption standards. Meanwhile, the once-dominant G7 nations have seen their influence wane, and a new wave of right-wing populism has disrupted Western politics. In the U.S. itself, President Joe Biden has surprisingly kept many “America First” economic policies that former President Trump introduced, such as certain tariffs and a domestic industrial policy rooted in the CHIPS and Inflation Reduction Acts.

Hence, references to the “liberal international order” often obscure the growing force of non-liberal trends in global politics. Moreover, labeling everything from state sovereignty to rule of law to international organizations as “liberal” overlooks how authoritarian regimes like China and Russia also engage in—and even build—multilateral institutions to advance their own agendas.

The Waning Infrastructure of American Power

Elements of the so-called liberal order form the core “infrastructure of American power,” enabling Washington to:

• • Influence or coerce other countries

• • Coordinate collective responses to global threats

• • Pursue its own security and economic interests

Trump’s ideological allies—right-wing populists, self-styled “realists,” and radical “America First” nationalists—seek to dismantle precisely these institutions, which the U.S. painstakingly established over 50+ years. Their hostility is driven by the belief that the U.S. pays disproportionate costs in sustaining a system that they see as no longer serving national interests, especially amid China’s and Russia’s rise.

Yet Russia and China have grasped the power these structures afford the U.S. and so do not attack institutions like the UN directly. Instead, they expand their clout inside such bodies, while setting up parallel ones, from the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These efforts undermine Washington’s dominance from within.

NATO as a Pillar of U.S. Grand Strategy

Although formally founded as a defensive alliance of liberal democracies, NATO was fundamentally rooted in two strategic principles for the post–World War II United States:

1. 1. Preventing a rival power from dominating Europe.

1. 1. Maintaining a permanent U.S. military presence on the continent to ensure that no single European state could become an adversary on par with the U.S.

In practice, NATO has:

• • Deterred the Soviet Union (and later, Russia).

• • Prevented renewed conflicts between Western European states.

• • Cemented the U.S. as the foremost security arbiter in Europe.

Trump and his supporters claim the U.S. can drastically scale back its NATO commitments without threatening these core objectives. The authors counter that the absence of a major European war and Russia’s historically modest threats to Western Europe are themselves direct results of America’s security guarantees. Even if the U.S. cut back its presence, current stability might hold for a while, but the potential risks—and costs of being wrong—could be immense.

Moreover, NATO also helps keep the U.S. and Europe aligned in an increasingly turbulent global landscape. U.S. support for Ukraine has galvanized NATO solidarity and, indirectly, readied allies to collaborate on containing China if needed. Hence, America’s commitment to the alliance is neither naive nor altruistic—it’s a cornerstone of U.S. power.

Authoritarian Rivals Embrace Multilateralism

Ironically, authoritarian competitors like Russia and China do not scorn multilateralism. They build and join alternative institutions, from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to new “China–Central Asia” mechanisms, precisely because they recognize the soft-power and diplomatic clout such frameworks provide. When Trump and his associates dismiss the importance of global institutions, they effectively leave space for Russia and China to shape them—and weaken the U.S. from within.

Meanwhile, countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America now enjoy alternative sources of funding and security guarantees. They can play major powers off each other, undermining any single hegemonic power’s ability to compel compliance. Even longtime U.S. partners—like India, Turkey, and the UAE—increasingly pursue multi-vector foreign policies, buying weaponry and forging ties with Russia or China without entirely forsaking Washington.

Eroding America’s “Moral” Edge

From an Islamic and broader Global South viewpoint, the American claim to uphold democracy and human rights has always been flawed—particularly when contrasted with Washington’s historical support for oppressive regimes in Muslim-majority nations. Yet many countries still cooperated with the U.S. because the promise of some consistency in its stated values gave it a moral edge over overtly authoritarian powers.

Should Washington under Trump’s second term make its foreign policy purely transactional—abandoning all rhetorical commitment to democracy, human rights, or anti-corruption—it would lose this moral leverage altogether. Allies would then choose partners on the basis of simple financial or security payoffs, forcing the U.S. to spend more to get less, and leaving the door wide open for Russia and China to expand their influence with fewer obstacles.

Furthermore, the U.S.’s capacity to impose financial sanctions, investigate foreign corruption, or block terrorist funding flows hinges on global acceptance of American dominance in the financial system. If U.S. leaders abuse these instruments for personal or partisan gain, other states might swiftly adopt alternative payment networks and currencies—undermining dollar hegemony, a cornerstone of American power.

Handing Over the Keys to Rivals

Cooley and Nexon caution that a second Trump administration, fueled by outright hostility to “liberal internationalism,” might inadvertently dismantle the “basic infrastructure of American power.” By dismissing NATO, global financial institutions, and rule-based economics as “liberal fantasies,” Trump’s inner circle could hand China and Russia an even freer hand in global affairs—especially across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Rather than champion stable alliances and moderate reforms that could make U.S. power more equitable and sustainable, Trump’s transaction-focused approach may alienate potential partners without diminishing the appeal of Washington’s rivals. In the end, the authors warn, it’s not so much that Trump will single-handedly “destroy” a vibrant liberal order—one that may already be in terminal decline—but that he might accelerate the breakdown of the very structures that have long underpinned American influence. And from an Islamic perspective, while the fall of a system that never truly served Muslim interests can open new diplomatic avenues, it may also unleash a more dangerous era of unbridled great-power competition—further complicating the pursuit of justice for oppressed peoples worldwide.