Western Warnings of Agreement Collapse: How Can Israel Achieve Its Goals?

The criminal war waged by Israel on the Gaza Strip for nearly 16 months officially ended yesterday, along with Israel’s ambitions to “eradicate” the resistance, displace Gaza’s residents, and repopulate the area with settlers. While wars are often viewed as mere “tools” rather than “ends in themselves,” as stated by Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, the coming phase is likely to be far more challenging for Israel and its patrons in the United States, as well as for the durability of the ceasefire. This is especially evident when it becomes clear that any “sustainable solution” in Gaza must account for the continued presence of Hamas and its popular support base—something fundamentally at odds with the objectives declared by Benjamin Netanyahu.

In this context, Mark Lynch, professor of political science at George Washington University and director of its Middle East Studies Program, emphasized in an interview with Foreign Affairs that the damage inflicted on Hamas does not negate the reality on the ground. He explained that Hamas “remains the only political organization capable of effectively maintaining control in Gaza.” Lynch further noted that if the ceasefire fails to swiftly improve Palestinian living conditions and no legitimate alternative governance emerges, Hamas could regain strength, particularly as it continued to recruit fighters up to the very last moments of the war at a pace “exceeding those it was losing.”

While Israel, following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, is unlikely to allow Hamas any official role in a future government in Gaza, Lynch argues that if regional and international actors are serious about restoring governance in Gaza and urgently providing humanitarian aid to its residents, there must be some form of “tacit agreement” allowing Hamas to continue existing. However, Lynch expresses skepticism about the durability of such an agreement, as it fundamentally clashes with Israel’s previously stated goals. Even if such an implicit understanding survives the initial phase, the question of Hamas’s role in governance during the second phase of the agreement could undermine any prospect of achieving “lasting peace.”

Other factors complicate Israel’s next steps. Many Israeli policymakers have pursued goals such as establishing a permanent buffer zone in northern Gaza, forcibly displacing Gaza’s population, resettling the area, or completely dismantling Hamas—objectives Netanyahu had promised but failed to deliver. Additionally, Israel has used the war as a pretext for aggressive actions elsewhere, such as in the West Bank. Meanwhile, within Palestine, “hardline factions” could rise again if they disapprove of how events unfold, alongside individuals seeking “revenge” against Israel for the atrocities they endured.

A report by the Brookings Institution noted that while a clear majority of Israelis supported the prisoner exchange deal, particularly its initial phase, many found it difficult to “swallow.” This reluctance stems not only from the continued control of Gaza by Hamas but also from the release of numerous Palestinian prisoners whom many Israelis view as “dangerous convicted terrorists.” The strongest example of this, in their minds, is Yahya Sinwar, who was released in a previous exchange deal only to later lead the October 7 attack.

Eyes Back on Iran

Returning to Clausewitz’s theory, a report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy speculated that if the strategist were alive today, he would question how Israel’s “military gains” could be translated into political outcomes. Otherwise, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) might find themselves returning to Gaza’s neighborhoods—such as Beit Hanoun and Jabalia—for a fourth or fifth time in the future. The report argues that without a viable alternative to Hamas, “which Israel cannot create,” Gaza will remain a burden, not a victory, for Israel.

Once again, American observers are pointing to Iran as the ultimate solution to Israel’s nightmares. The report notes that while Israeli policymakers might feel compelled to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, force alone cannot achieve lasting political change without a strategy to establish a “new political reality.” According to the report, such a strategy should aim to achieve two goals: ending the war in Gaza and withdrawing militarily, conditional on the release of detainees, while simultaneously “reducing Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to the point where building a nuclear weapon becomes impossible.” Naturally, Israel cannot accomplish these goals without an “active American role.”

Given this, proponents of this perspective recommend that President-elect Donald Trump pressure Israel to allow France to play a role in Gaza’s governance. With American support, countries such as the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and several European nations are reportedly willing to establish a transitional administration in Gaza to replace Hamas and prevent a power vacuum. They also advise Trump to use the threat of military action against Tehran—either directly or via Tel Aviv—rather than relying solely on economic pressure. This would align with Saudi Arabia’s interests, as neutralizing the Iranian threat could encourage Riyadh and Netanyahu to make concessions on key issues related to Gaza, Palestinian politics, and Saudi recognition of Israel. However, if the war persists and Israel remains in Gaza, regional tensions with Israel, including in Riyadh, will remain high.

What Biden Did Not “Dare” to Do

President Joe Biden’s failure to reach an agreement before Trump’s election victory and his reluctance to threaten Israel with military aid cuts left him in a weak position. Instead, he limited his actions to urging Israel to cease its attacks on civilians while approving new military aid packages. According to Bloomberg, one of the key factors leading to the ceasefire agreement at this specific moment was Trump’s ultimatum to Netanyahu: either accept the U.S. administration’s terms or face “isolation.” Conversely, Biden lacked the “courage” to make similar threats, allowing Trump to claim credit for the diplomatic progress initiated by the previous administration. Another crucial factor, Bloomberg noted, was the timing. Unlike Ukraine, the benefits of ending the Gaza war now outweighed the losses for all parties involved. After Netanyahu rejected a similar proposal in August, Israeli forces achieved “relatively little” following the killing of a Hamas leader who was “quickly replaced.”