Is Israel Planning a Ground Intervention in Gaza Again?

On the morning of March 18, Israel resumed its intensive military operations in the Gaza Strip. These operations came amid ongoing discussions regarding the proposal presented by U.S. envoy Steve Wietkoff to resolve the deadlock over the ceasefire agreement, which Israel violated by not adhering to it, both during its first phase and after the second phase deadline had passed.

The decision to resume the assault on Gaza aligns with Israel’s primary objective in its continuous breach of the agreement: to restart the war. This does not necessarily mean that Israel would have resisted pursuing Wietkoff’s proposal if Hamas had accepted it under Israeli conditions. In essence, the agreement would have been one between the victor and the defeated, essentially a surrender agreement in which Hamas would relinquish half of the Israeli prisoners without accepting any of its political demands, especially the commitment to end the war and withdraw from Gaza.

Thus, Israel aims to exert military pressure on Hamas by targeting political leaders, government officials, and civilians to compel Hamas to agree to Wietkoff’s proposal and to solidify the equation of negotiation between the defeated and the victorious. This equation has significant implications for the future of the agreement and the current political trajectory.

The primary goal of the current military operations is to intensify pressure on Hamas, ensuring that if it accepts the proposal under military duress, it will cement Israel’s treatment of Hamas in any future negotiations. This would ultimately result in the release of the remaining prisoners, at which point Israel would likely continue using the same military pressure tactic to coerce Hamas into accepting Israeli political conditions for a sustainable ceasefire.

In other words, these military operations were bound to occur regardless of the proposal’s political phase. The choice to resume the war reflects the Israeli government’s preference for military action. The appointment of Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir as Chief of Staff fits into this context—Zamir is not burdened by any sense of failure from the October 7th attack, nor does he feel any moral obligation towards the Israeli prisoners. He is poised to carry out operations that serve the Israeli government’s policies.

This doesn’t mean that the former Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, didn’t wage a war of annihilation in Gaza—he is, after all, responsible for the destruction in the Gaza Strip. However, he executed that as part of war objectives, including the liberation of Israeli prisoners. When the ceasefire agreement was signed in January, Halevi considered his mission complete and resigned, partly taking responsibility for the failure and also realizing that Netanyahu would resume the war after the first phase. He didn’t want to be a partner in such a move, which could jeopardize the prisoners’ lives or their potential release.

On the other hand, Zamir, eager to initiate a war on Gaza, is not doing so primarily for the prisoners, as claimed, but rather to fulfill the Israeli government’s agendas regarding the occupation of Gaza, displacement, and permanently making Gaza uninhabitable.

The Israeli government is counting on Trump’s support for this approach, despite Israel’s lack of serious commitment to the agreement during its first phase. Israel has effectively planned for this moment in Gaza and intends to complete it by dismissing the head of the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security agency), a figure similar to Halevi in his commitment to the prisoner issue, and a key member of the Israeli negotiating team for the January ceasefire agreement.

It is expected that Israel will continue its military operations, focusing on airstrikes and inflicting significant losses on Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip.

A ground phase, however, is not an easy transition at this stage, although it remains a possible option and is being prepared for. The main obstacle to a ground invasion is the lack of consensus within Israel on resuming the war, making it difficult to carry out a large-scale ground invasion without broad support, particularly since there is a deeply entrenched belief—especially after the testimonies of released prisoners—that military operations may endanger the lives of the living prisoners and could prevent their release.

Adding complexity to the ground invasion and occupation of Gaza is the requirement to summon hundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers, many of whom are already fatigued from their previous long service (some served for 350 days). Furthermore, the government’s refusal to legislate a law for the conscription of Haredi religious soldiers will make the social scene more complicated and lead to further rejection of reserve service, especially since the ground invasion would not serve the Israeli prisoner issue.

As a result, the government will likely continue its airstrikes to deal with the obstacles of a ground invasion while passing the state budget at the end of the month.

Therefore, the resumption of military operations also serves the purpose of maintaining governmental cohesion and reintroducing the “Jewish Power” party led by Itamar Ben-Gvir into the government to ensure the passage of the state budget, so Netanyahu can avoid blackmail from the Haredi religious parties, who have threatened not to vote for the budget unless a law is passed to exempt the religious from military service.

As military operations resume, public protests in Israeli society against the government are expected to increase. However, it has become clear that these protests have not affected the government’s decision to resume operations, and this stems from two factors. First, the support for the agreement and the priority of the prisoner issue among Israelis has not translated into significant popular movement, which may change if the war resumes and triggers large-scale protests, such as protests by reservists, opposition to constitutional changes, the dismissal of the Shin Bet head, and protests by the families of prisoners.

The second factor is that prisoner families are relying on Trump to pressure Netanyahu. This bet has proven to be futile, but it contributed to the reduction in protest activity, as supporters of the prisoner issue pinned their hopes on Trump to take action instead of directly pressuring the government.

It has become evident that Trump has played a role in pushing for these military operations, which might alter the protest strategy, focusing it more on the government and its members, potentially expanding it further.