Features of the New World Order: Canada for Trump, Ukraine for Putin, Taiwan for China

What is the common factor between Trump’s call for control over Canada and Greenland, his plan to end the war in Ukraine by forcing it to cede its lands to Russia, and China’s ambitions to control Taiwan and expand its presence in the South China Sea?

According to Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in an article published in Foreign Affairs magazine, these developments represent a return to an era of “spheres of influence,” where major powers divide the world into exclusive zones of influence. Within this division, the independence of smaller states is undermined, and their sovereignty violated.

After the end of World War II in 1945, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin sought to divide Europe into “spheres of influence” as the quickest way to prevent another catastrophic world war. However, by the end of the Cold War, these divisions collapsed, and the world entered a phase focused on economic cooperation and collective security.

Now, with the collapse of globalization and the rise of nationalist policies in the United States, we are witnessing an unprecedented “geopolitical backlash,” and nearly all countries will soon have to contend with its consequences.

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The Translation:

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was not merely a regional conflict. His “illegal” annexation of Crimea in 2014 was part of a broader Russian test of the so-called “rules-based international order,” where Putin sought to gauge how serious the West was about defending this system.

What actually happened was that the war that followed forced Europe to reconsider its reliance on the United States, pushed American leaders to reassess their willingness to fulfill foreign commitments, and led China to take on a new role supportive of Russia. It also prompted countries thousands of miles away to wrestle with fundamental questions about their future: How can they balance partnerships with the warring powers? What material and moral choices should they make now that will seem wise when looked back upon decades later?

During the two decades after the Cold War, many of these questions were less urgent, as the collapse of the Soviet Union alleviated Western fears about the outbreak of another world war—fears that had often led Western leaders to tolerate Soviet spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

At that time, many political leaders and analysts hoped that the advent of multilateralism and new efforts at collective security would render zero-sum geopolitical competitions irrelevant forever.

But after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis cast a shadow over Western economies, Putin consolidated power in Russia, and China rapidly expanded its global influence, geopolitics began to return swiftly to its old dynamics based largely on hard power.

Major powers began again using their military capabilities, economic influence, and diplomatic weight to secure “spheres of influence”—areas where they exert military, economic, and political control without formally imposing sovereignty.

While another world war has not yet loomed on the horizon, the current geopolitical scene bears a striking resemblance to the end of World War II when U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin sought to divide Europe into “spheres of influence.” Today, major powers are negotiating a new world order much like the Allies did when they redrew the world map in the 1945 Yalta negotiations.

This time, however, negotiations may not necessarily occur in an official conference, but if Russian President Putin, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping reach an informal consensus that “the politics of power” are more important than ideological disagreements, they will follow in the footsteps of Yalta in determining the sovereignty and future of neighboring countries.

Unlike what happened at Yalta, where two democratic states negotiated with a single authoritarian regime, the identity of the system no longer hinders shared interests. In a time dominated by “hard power,” everyone returns to the old principle that “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”

In such a world, multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union will be marginalized, and the sovereignty of smaller states will be threatened like never before in decades.

It is no coincidence that the countries leading the return of hard power over the past two decades—China, Russia, and the United States—are all led by leaders who embrace the narrative of “making their countries great again.” These leaders focus on a frustrated comparison between the current state of their countries—restricted, in their view, by foreign and domestic adversaries—and an imagined past of greater freedom and glory.

The humiliation generated by this comparison fuels the belief that the salvation of their countries can only be achieved through hard power. The control and expansion of “spheres of influence” seem to revive that fading sense of greatness.

For China, Taiwan alone will not suffice to answer this call, just as Ukraine will never be enough for Putin’s vision of Russia’s rightful place in the world. As for the United States, it has begun looking toward annexing Canada.

However, there remains another potential path, where the European Union and NATO adjust rather than fade away entirely.

In this scenario, these powers (NATO and the European Union) would work to balance the efforts of the United States, Russia, and China, who are using blunt force to achieve their narrow interests, potentially jeopardizing world peace, security, and prosperity. But for this balancing act to succeed, these powers would need to fight for this alternative and exploit the obstacles imposed by today’s “more globalized” world on the great powers seeking to dismantle it.

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Vicious Cycles

The term “spheres of influence” first appeared at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, where European colonial empires formally established the rules for dividing Africa. However, this concept shaped international strategy long before that.

During the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), France tried to extend its influence by conquering neighboring lands and installing client regimes, only to be opposed by coalitions led by Britain and Austria.

Similarly, the British and Russian empires engaged in prolonged struggles to control Central Asia, particularly Afghanistan, while the Monroe Doctrine adopted by the United States in 1823 declared that European powers should not interfere in the Western Hemisphere, effectively establishing Latin America as an area of exclusive U.S. influence.

It is worth noting that the Monroe Doctrine was partially inspired by Russian Emperor Alexander I’s efforts to counter British and U.S. influence in the Pacific Northwest by expanding his settlements and asserting control over trade.

Nevertheless, Russia ultimately agreed, under the 1824 Russian-American agreement, to limit its expansion southward and recognize U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere after Alexander I realized that encouraging further European colonization in the Americas could spark more wars.

The major powers’ quest to establish “spheres of influence” continued throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading to new alliances and ultimately sparking World War I.

In his efforts to delegitimize the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman empires, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson condemned colonialism as an oppressive force that trampled on nations’ right to self-determination. His condemnation had collateral damage for his allies in Britain and France, who were struggling to maintain their colonies in the face of rising nationalist movements.

By the end of World War II, both “spheres of influence” and colonialism were seen as “reactionary” concepts that fueled conflicts.

Later, at the Yalta Conference, the policy of “spheres of influence” made a decisive return. The participating democracies accepted it as a “necessary evil” in the hope that it would be short-lived—a lesser evil to prevent another catastrophic world war.

The United States and Britain were weary of war, and no democratic politician could oppose the idea of withdrawing or disbanding forces. On the other hand, Stalin did not face this problem. In the absence of any other means to deter him, the only option to prevent Stalin from sending the Red Army westward was simply to meet his demands.

Throughout the 19th century, “power politics” was based on military and economic capabilities. However, by the latter half of the 20th century, the ability to shape global narratives through soft power became just as important. The U.S. specifically exerted influence through its dominance of popular culture, foreign aid, higher education, and investment in initiatives like the Peace Corps and democracy-building efforts.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, actively promoted communist ideology through propaganda campaigns aimed at shaping public opinion in distant countries.

Indeed, Moscow was a pioneer in a new form of attack on democratic countries under the guise of “active measures,” a long-term strategy designed to sow division among democratic populations by spreading disinformation.

However, as ideological battles receded in the face of market liberalization, democracy, and globalization in the early 1990s, “spheres of influence” lost their importance.

Without the sharp ideological divide that characterized the Cold War, many political scientists assumed that global politics would shift toward economic integration as a manifestation of collective ability to meet tough challenges.

The global spread of democratic norms and the rapid integration of former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries into international institutions reinforced the belief that power should—and could—be exercised through collective frameworks. The geopolitical fault lines of the Cold War seemed to fade without return.

The NATO-Russia founding treaty of 1997, a clear example of this shift, explicitly committed its signatories to avoid creating spheres of influence and called for Russia and NATO to seek a “common area of security and stability in Europe without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.”

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The Tough Return

To be fair, we must note that “power politics” reemerged long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Events like the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, which Putin found provocative, and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq (despite opposition from Washington’s close allies) demonstrated that leaders of the so-called new era of collective security still believed that when a strong state does not get what it wants, escalating militarily to achieve its objectives is acceptable.

Furthermore, the United States and China have recently engaged in a struggle for global technological and economic dominance, with Washington imposing sanctions on Chinese tech giants while Beijing has heavily invested in alternative supply chains and its massive Belt and Road Initiative.

Meanwhile, China has militarized the South China Sea and pursued expansionist and legally contested territorial claims. The U.S. and its allies have increasingly used financial sanctions as tools to constrain their adversaries.

Russia, despite its material weaknesses, has effectively used hybrid warfare to undermine the West, including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns to influence key events like the 2016 Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections.

Putin’s rhetoric clearly shows that he has never abandoned his understanding of geopolitics based on “spheres of influence.” He has struggled to comprehend why NATO persists, let alone its continuous expansion.

This NATO expansion, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has turned all of Europe—especially former Warsaw Pact countries—into an American sphere of influence, a result that Putin has never accepted.

In response, Russia launched its attack on Georgia in 2008, relying on hybrid warfare and armed proxies. This escalated with the “illegal” annexation of Crimea in 2014 and culminated in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Ukraine’s war—and the terms of settlement that seem to be emerging—signals a clearer return to the 19th-century geopolitics, where great powers impose their terms on weaker nations.

Russia, along with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has demanded that Ukraine accept the reality that it will not regain the territories it has lost and remain outside Western military alliances, which would effectively make it a satellite state of Russia.

If these pressures succeed, the outcome will be the normalization of military force as a means to achieve national interests—and, more dangerously, a reward for its use.

This last point (rewarding military force) is crucial. While the great powers have attempted to use force to achieve their goals over the past few decades, these attempts have consistently backfired, failing to prove that force is an effective tool to advance national interests.

For instance, U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya were costly failures, and Russia’s military efforts to prop up Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad ultimately failed, while its incursion into Ukraine has been sluggish. Yet, the most significant shift in U.S. foreign policy since World War II has ultimately given Russia’s “power politics” policy a victory.

Simultaneously, a new pattern of “power politics” is quickly taking root elsewhere. This involves a dominant power establishing “spheres of influence” that diminish the sovereignty of neighboring countries, as Trump aims to do with Canada, Greenland, and Mexico, and as China seeks to do with Taiwan.

It is important to note that the political system based on spheres of influence relies on an implicit agreement between great powers to refrain from intervening in each other’s spheres.

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Circular Logic

In terms of its current military and economic strength, Russia is no longer a superpower in today’s world, but the way modern Russia is compared to the Soviet Union often grants it perceived strength that surpasses its actual capabilities. It is still an effective nuclear power.

In a scenario where the U.S., China, and Russia all agree on the vital interest of avoiding nuclear war, mutual recognition of each other’s spheres of influence could serve as a deterrent to escalation.

Thus, negotiations to end the war in Ukraine could resemble a “new Yalta,” with China playing a role similar to that of Britain in 1945—balancing U.S. and Soviet interests while ensuring its own geopolitical concerns are met.

However, accurately dividing spheres of influence is a more complicated task than in the Yalta days when it was easier to delineate—and respect—geographically coherent spheres in a less globalized world reliant on steel and oil. Today, critical resources are distributed across the globe, making it harder to define clear boundaries.

Taiwan serves as an important example of this truth because the chips it produces are crucial to the growth and national security of countries. The U.S. cannot allow China to control it, nor does the U.S. want Russia to have exclusive access to the rare earth minerals in Ukraine.

While maritime power has become more important than ever, it is conceivable that Japan and Taiwan will fall within the U.S. sphere of influence, despite being close to China. This is why China is striving to become a naval power and tirelessly working to disrupt American maritime influence.

Even if Trump and Putin move toward a more cooperative relationship with Xi, this will leave Europe with a tough challenge of relying on itself. In such a case, countries like Germany and France may be forced to devise independent security strategies.

Similarly, Eastern European nations, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, are likely to seek greater defense commitments that other European countries may not be able or willing to provide. This outcome would also undermine the strategic importance of the U.S. allies in Asia, forcing them to seek alternative defense arrangements that could include nuclear armament.

It is also not out of the question that the European Union could evolve into a federalized state like the United States. After all, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are still medium powers with formidable capabilities, and both France and the UK possess their own nuclear deterrents. Together, they could feel less vulnerable militarily and economically against China, Russia, and the U.S.

If the U.S. and Russia were to ally against China, Japan and South Korea might find themselves trying to balance between Washington and Beijing, pursuing more independent foreign policies, with greater reliance on self-defense, and diversifying their economic and security partnerships.

Should Russia ally more closely with China, while Europe remains firmly allied with the United States, this would lead to a bipolar system akin to the Cold War. However, if Russia (which fears appearing subordinate to China) and European countries adopt a more independent course, it could contribute to the emergence of a multipolar world, where many powers oscillate between Washington and Beijing.

In this case, global geopolitics would resemble a mix of 19th-century great power maneuvers with 21st-century “strategic blocks” politics.

Australia will face difficult choices regarding its economic and security alliances, between strengthening its defense cooperation with the U.S., deepening its partnerships with India and Japan, increasing military spending for deterrence, and striving to appear as a regional stabilizing factor, showing greater independence instead of remaining a junior partner in a U.S.-led block. This will be especially challenging if China succeeds in securing its desired sphere of influence in Asia.

Spheres of influence are rarely static and remain subject to ongoing contestation, but their resurgence suggests that the nature of the global order is undergoing a real test. This shift could certainly lead us back to a “power politics” approach seen in previous eras, but fortunately, there is a less dangerous alternative.

After witnessing a world order of disruptive crises, the international system might reaffirm itself in a return to a rules-based order, centered around multilateral cooperation, economic globalization, and collective security arrangements that curb expansionist ambitions.

What is certain is that the United States can no longer be relied upon as a stabilizing force. While Washington was once the primary deterrent against regional expansionist regimes, it now seems to encourage such regimes, even mimicking them.

Whether this shift will eventually lead to a balance of power or open a long era of instability and war depends on how seriously countries like China, India, Iran, Russia, and the United States pursue securing their respective “spheres of influence.”