Will War Return to Lebanon?

The motivation, preparedness, and desire to continue the war have been evident from the moment the ceasefire agreement in Gaza was announced. Benjamin Netanyahu did not lie when he stated that the only thing that matters to him is the first phase: to break the deadlock surrounding the fate of the Israeli prisoners held by the resistance in Palestine. This is not out of concern for their fate but because, politically, he needs such steps.

What cannot be disputed within the occupation state is that it is no longer possible to stop the war until the people of Gaza are dealt with. The war that has been reignited will aim to bring the cycle of blood back to the Gaza Strip and its people, with an additional push to encourage migration.

Is this matter limited to Gaza?

Certainly not, as Israel’s drive to continue the war with the rest of the resistance axis is increasing. Let’s review the fronts one by one:

• • In the West Bank, Israeli forces continue with operations of annexation and displacement, with an initial goal of emptying all Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and pushing their inhabitants out of Palestine. In the West Bank, there is also a daily implementation of decisions to destroy what remains of the Palestinian Authority’s structure, keeping only those who manage local affairs under occupation terms. Pressure has risen with the involvement of security and military leaders in pursuing the project of killing and arresting resistance fighters.

• • In Syria, Israel sees no reason to stop its expansionist operations, whether through direct occupation in some areas or through military and security control over others. Israel is progressing with a project to create a sectarian state that separates the entity’s borders from the interior of Syria, which may, at some point, include annexing some land from Jordan to create this state. Israel does not care who governs in Damascus, whether it is Bashar al-Assad or Ahmad al-Shara, because what matters to Israel is that Syria remains divided, and there is no unified force in the country.

• • In Iraq, extensive intelligence efforts, in cooperation with the U.S., are being made in preparation for security strikes where possible, even direct military strikes if necessary. The goal is not to eliminate the factions involved in the resistance axis but to cut the connections between Iraq and the Levant. Israel is also working to expand its influence along Syria’s eastern borders, relying on significant American efforts to revive sectarian strife within Iraq, not only to weaken it but to create an atmosphere that distances Iraq from Iran and any connection to something called Palestine.

• • In Yemen, Israel assumes that the U.S. must form a serious alliance, with Israel as a part, which includes the Gulf countries and some African nations, to overthrow “Ansar Allah” (the Houthis) and destroy their capabilities, removing them from power in Sanaa. This operation will not only involve American military strikes but also large-scale security operations that Israel is working hard to prepare, alongside efforts to reignite the civil war between northern and southern Yemen, with noticeable cooperation with the UAE and pushing Saudi Arabia to re-engage fully in the war.

• • In Iran itself, Israel continues to consider, and rightly so, that the Islamic Republic is the center of the entire opposing axis. Israel does not want the U.S. to launch military operations against civilian, military, or nuclear facilities in the country. Instead, it wants Washington to lead a military coalition to pressure Iran and push it toward an internal explosion that would topple the regime. Israel will not stop preparing for this war, cooperating with the U.S. administration, which believes it can “educate” the entire world with a major strike on Iran. Israel views eliminating the Iranian threat as the key to dismantling the entire resistance axis, particularly in Lebanon and Palestine.

What about Lebanon?

When Israel agreed to the ceasefire, it was calculating what was happening on the ground. It’s true that Israel delivered unprecedented strikes on Hezbollah, but it was shocked that the party did not collapse after two weeks, as it had assumed.

Military and security operatives in the enemy state know that this was not about destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Israel cannot claim it has the ability to destroy the party’s entire capabilities; instead, it is about managing these capabilities, a task that has two arms—political and military.

Israel discovered in the last week of October that collapse was not imminent, so it decided to move to a level of pressure aimed at imposing new political and field realities. However, developments did not yield the desired result, so Israel moved toward an agreement that could be said to be favorable to them in nature, but one they were forced into.

Nonetheless, Israel does not consider the Lebanon file closed. Instead, it has become more convinced that the file is open in a way different from before. Therefore, internal pressures on Lebanon emerged, manifesting in the form of the implementation mechanism for the ceasefire decision and the political developments in Lebanon, particularly the formation of a new government under American guardianship.

What has occurred so far confirms to Israel that the problem still exists in Lebanon, that Hezbollah has not disappeared, and that it is capable of rebuilding itself in a different way.

What Israel is doing today is reconstituting a new target bank and trying to reach the new mindset that manages Hezbollah after the war, preparing for the return of war, regardless of its form, nature, scope, mechanisms, and tools.

However, what worries Israel on the Lebanese front is not limited to the possibility of a large ground confrontation with Hezbollah, but the fact that the resistance has the ability to harm the enemy through its air and missile power.

This is what makes the enemy exert maximum pressure through continuous airstrikes and assassinations of resistance elements, alongside political pressure to push Lebanon’s government to prevent Hezbollah from carrying out any actions that could threaten Israel. The Americans believe that this is possible by pushing Lebanon toward political negotiations that would lead to normalization with the enemy. However, Israel, which understands Lebanon more than the Americans, and desires political relations with it, knows that achieving such a goal requires a major war, perhaps surpassing the scale and scope of the 1982 invasion.

The above leads us to a single conclusion: Israel will not stop its aggression, killing, and occupation. The matter is no longer about occupying Palestine only but expanding influence and occupation to include all surrounding countries, intervening in their situations to the furthest extent. This requires that those concerned with the region’s stability or Lebanon’s continued existence on the map view the matter from the angle that the enemy is not interested in buying promises, guarantees, or covenants. Instead, it is pursuing one thing: carrying out the task itself, as it sees fit.

This brings us to the clarification that the resistance option is not a political luxury or an ethical action; it is a necessary human act that has no substitute, no matter the costs.