Trump Administration Offers Iran the “UAE Nuclear Model” in New Proposal

In a new diplomatic development, the Trump administration has reportedly proposed a nuclear deal to Iran that mirrors the “UAE model”—allowing Iran to operate civilian nuclear reactors without the right to enrich uranium domestically, according to a report by Yedioth Ahronoth.

The proposal, which emerged during ongoing indirect negotiations, suggests Iran could import enriched uranium for its civilian nuclear needs, rather than enrich it locally—a framework similar to that used by the United Arab Emirates, which imports its nuclear fuel and operates under stringent international oversight.

The U.S. Position: Civilian Use, No Enrichment

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently stated that:

“Iran, like many countries around the world, can import enriched uranium for civilian reactors instead of enriching it themselves.”

Rubio emphasised that if Tehran insists on enriching uranium domestically, it would be the only country in the world doing so without a declared weapons program, raising major proliferation concerns.

The Context: Fallout from the 2015 Nuclear Deal

Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to limit its uranium enrichment to 3.67% until 2031. However, following Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement during his first term, Iran began escalating its program, enriching uranium up to 60%—just a technical step away from weapons-grade.

The latest U.S. offer aims to prevent Iran from achieving “threshold nuclear state” status by keeping its enrichment capabilities at zero, effectively freezing its breakout potential.

Tehran’s Response: A Resounding Rejection

Iran has firmly rejected the proposal.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters:

“Zero enrichment is unacceptable.”

Ali Shamkhani, a senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, also dismissed the proposal, criticising what he called the “Emirati model”—which involves reliance on imported nuclear fuel and prohibits local enrichment.

Currently, Iran operates the Bushehr nuclear plant using Russian-supplied fuel, which is returned to Moscow after use. While this limits Iran’s control over the fuel cycle, experts note that spent fuel can still theoretically be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium, though Iran has not taken this step.

Analysts: Iran Won’t Concede Strategic Leverage

According to Richard Nephew, a former U.S. negotiator in the 2015 talks, the idea of abandoning enrichment has long been a sticking point. Iran argues that it needs to develop domestic enrichment not only for self-reliance but potentially for future export to other countries.

Nephew notes that:

“Iran has always feared being cut off from nuclear fuel and doesn’t trust global supply guarantees.”

A Deal Dead on Arrival?

Military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai from Yedioth Ahronoth assessed that Tehran is unlikely to accept such a proposal.

“The chances are close to zero,” he wrote, noting that a deal under IAEA supervision which eliminates Iran’s enrichment capacity would dismantle its nuclear threshold status—a strategic deterrent Iran has spent years building.

“Agreeing to this would be seen as a massive strategic surrender,” Ben-Yishai added, suggesting it would signal weakness in the eyes of Iran’s leadership.

Even with the lifting of sanctions and potential access to Western economic ties, the price is too high, he concluded.

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