Did the Palestinian Resistance Win?

At first glance, asking this question amidst the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza may seem to diminish its gravity or ignore its dimensions. However, on the contrary, it is an urgent and necessary question for several reasons. Foremost among them is the profound and multifaceted humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Moreover, the question has been posed in various forms and often in misleading ways by different parties for disparate purposes, necessitating discussion and evaluation.

The significant sacrifices made by the people of Gaza have been used as evidence of defeat or as a critique of the October 7, 2023 decision, often influenced by or exploiting the heavy losses for political agendas. However, direct material losses—human, economic, and infrastructural—are not the sole metric, and they may not even be the most critical factor (despite their importance) in evaluating wars, especially asymmetrical conflicts like resistance against occupation. In these cases, the power imbalance means the weaker party—the resistance—often endures far greater losses than the stronger, occupying force.

Thus, assessments cannot rely purely on a humanitarian lens or focus on one side alone. Instead, they must account for context, circumstances, variables, actors, and objectives, as well as the terms of any agreements, the enemy’s short- and long-term losses, and, most importantly, a fundamentally different perspective on evaluating this war.

The Occupier’s Losses

Wars involve two parties, making it self-evident that one side’s losses are insufficient to evaluate outcomes—even if losses are a key factor. Therefore, despite the immense sacrifices of Gazans, the losses of the occupying force must also be considered.

Here, it is not only about direct losses—deaths, injuries, captives, and economic damage—though these are significant and exceed those of any previous conflict. Rather, the focus is on more strategic dimensions.

The occupier failed to achieve any of its major war objectives. It did not recover its captives through force without an agreement, did not eliminate the resistance, and did not entirely expel Hamas from Gaza. It also failed to prevent ongoing threats to the “Israeli” interior.

Conversely, the Palestinians achieved most of their stated conditions for the agreement, including a ceasefire, a prisoner exchange, the entry of aid, the return of displaced persons, and reconstruction—though practical implementation remains to be seen in the near future.

Moreover, the Palestinian resistance shattered key pillars of “Israeli” national security and military strategy on October 7. Deterrence collapsed, early warning systems failed, the war was fought on “Israeli” territory, and the occupier was unable to achieve a swift resolution.

These failures resulted in significant strategic losses for “Israel,” which can no longer present itself as a haven of stability and prosperity for its society. Nor can it claim to be a secure base that prevents any party from contemplating resistance, let alone attacking it. This has been reflected in declining immigration to “Israel” and increasing emigration abroad.

In addition to these losses, “Israel” suffered a blow to its image of power and deterrence. This was not only evident to the Palestinian resistance and its allies but also to entities not directly in conflict with “Israel.” Turkey’s foreign minister (and former intelligence chief) noted “serious flaws” in “Israel’s” security system, while former Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal stated that “Hamas’ operation shattered Israel’s image of strength globally.”

These losses are of a strategic nature, with far-reaching implications that could exacerbate internal problems and fuel additional crises. They directly relate to the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its long-term trajectory, especially when combined with “Israel’s” loss of international reputation, its struggle to control the narrative globally, and its potential prosecution in the International Court of Justice (for genocide) and the International Criminal Court. These are not losses to be underestimated.

Why the “Al-Aqsa Flood”?

The above factors explain why many in “Israel” consider themselves defeated, why Palestinians are seen as victorious, and why the agreement’s terms are perceived to favor the latter. Some have even labeled it an agreement of humiliation or surrender, and numerous political, military, and security resignations occurred during and after the war and the agreement’s signing.

Nevertheless, questions persist among some: “Yes, the occupier failed to achieve its goals, and the resistance endured and achieved most of its objectives through the agreement. But some or most of these outcomes did not exist prior to October 7. Moreover, considering the heavy toll, was the decision for the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ justified?”

This question assumes, implicitly, that those who made the decision on October 7 anticipated all these repercussions, including the genocidal war. It suggests they either proceeded despite these expectations or “failed to foresee” the fallout. These assumptions, however, lack theoretical and practical validity.

Practically, it was evident that “Al-Aqsa Flood” differed from previous confrontations with the occupier, and that the response would thus be harsher, including a ground invasion of Gaza. However, the resistance clearly prepared for this possibility, particularly through structural adjustments in Al-Qassam Brigades’ formations across Gaza, as well as its combat strategies and weapons deployment.

Theoretically and ethically, there is a dangerous fallacy in this line of thinking, which treats genocide as a predictable and logical reaction that should have been anticipated or avoided through specific actions. This is neither accurate nor morally defensible.

Should the Palestinian resistance have anticipated that the reaction to Gaza’s resistance would be the wholesale invasion of the strip, targeting its people, infrastructure, and facilities? Should it have foreseen mass displacement, genocidal campaigns, and “Israel’s” unprecedented and unconditional—even active—support from the West, led by the United States? Or that the Arab and Islamic world would remain spectators, complicit or impotent, failing to deliver even basic humanitarian aid as the world tolerated nearly 500 consecutive days of daily massacres?

The genocide was only possible due to the stances of various actors throughout the aggression. How, then, can these roles be overlooked while the blame is directed at the only party that fulfilled its responsibilities almost flawlessly?

Furthermore, “Israel’s” national security principles underwent a radical transformation during the last war, as previous foundations collapsed, making it difficult to compare this confrontation to earlier ones.

While the sidelining of “Israeli” security systems on October 7 played a major role in this transformation, it was not the sole factor. Independent regional and international dynamics also contributed. For example, Hezbollah’s stance in Lebanon evolved without dramatic changes to the rules of engagement in southern Lebanon, and the West Bank offers another example.

In this sense, the ground invasion of Gaza can be viewed as a distinct phase or war, separate from “Al-Aqsa Flood,” even if influenced by it. Therefore, evaluating the “Flood” decision solely based on the genocide’s toll is akin to assessing one battle’s decision based on unrelated outcomes.

This perspective also overlooks the war’s long-term ramifications for the occupier, including internal divisions, trials, resignations, and existential concerns such as declining deterrence, dependence on major powers, economic strain, eroding public trust in the military-security establishment, and a growing sense of insecurity.

Resistance: A Mandate to Liberate

Lastly, rejecting proactive operations or offensives under the pretext that the occupier’s response will be bloody undermines the essence of resistance, whose mission and responsibility is liberation, not mere skirmishing. The occupier will always seek to maximize the cost of resistance as part of its psychological warfare strategy. This necessitates caution in adopting narratives that may inadvertently serve its objectives.

Conclusion

The mere survival of Gaza’s people through the atrocities inflicted upon them by the occupier over these months is a monumental achievement. The resilience of the Palestinian people and their resistance in the face of genocide demands a solemn, composed acknowledgment of the sacrifices made.

Yet, it is also the right of this great people, who have borne immense suffering and stood firm despite annihilation attempts, to be assured that their sacrifices were not in vain. Their resilience bore fruit, leading to victory. The occupier’s retreat and capitulation in the final agreement were direct results of the resistance’s courage and the people’s unyielding resolve, which thwarted the occupier’s expectations of surrender or abandonment of the resistance.

Gaza and its people have triumphed, not as a matter of empty rhetoric, but through an objective evaluation of the war, its immediate results, and the agreement’s terms. More importantly, they have laid the groundwork for continuing the liberation project in the long term.

The focus now should be on drawing lessons to improve future strategies and offering constructive advice in this direction—not through blame or claims of superior wisdom. The priority must be taking responsibility, not merely speaking about it, though discourse remains crucial.