Winning if Not Defeated: What is the Logic of Resistance?

The maze expands; perhaps this description accurately depicts the situation in the Middle East as the Gaza war enters its seventh month.

The nature of war never changes; it is fought for political purposes. This was the view of the Prussian general and military historian Carl von Clausewitz. However, it is certain that the characteristics of war change according to changes in economic, political, and social dimensions, not to forget the technological aspects.

Clausewitz’s most famous observation was about the nature of the conflict itself. War and politics are intertwined, as he says: “War in itself does not suspend political relations or transform them into something entirely different. Political relations continue regardless of the means we use.”

In other words, Clausewitz believed that war is part of a connected chain that includes trade, diplomacy, and all other interactions between peoples and governments. This theory challenged the beliefs of older generations of soldiers and military theorists who viewed war as an “event that begins and ends” and pushed fighters into an alternate reality governed by a different set of rules. War, for Clausewitz, was simply another means of obtaining something he desired.

Victory, according to Clausewitz, is a matter of finding and neutralizing the opponent’s “center of gravity,” often meaning defeating the rival army. However, this method is not always the most effective, as he sees that “ethical elements are among the most important elements in war. They form the spirit that permeates the entire war, and ensure a close connection to the will that moves and leads a whole mass of force.” Here, Clausewitz elaborated on how to shape or break the spirit of your opponent, and how to triumph over them in war. But Clausewitz also ridiculed the theory that war could occur without bloodshed, saying, “Do not talk to us about leaders who become victorious without shedding blood.” War is a conflict of individuals, selfishness, and wills.

In his definition of war, he says: “We will not try to give a definition of war that is elaborate and heavy. Let us suffice with the spirit of this war, that is, let us suffice with the struggle, for war is nothing different from combat on a wide scale. If we want to combine in one concept the multiple conflicts that war consists of, it is good to think of two combatants, each trying with their physical strength to subdue their opponent to their will. Their immediate goal is to throw their opponent to the ground to render him helpless against any resistance. So war, in this sense, is an act of violence aimed at compelling the opponent to execute our will.” War, then, in this sense, is a struggle of wills primarily.

Clausewitz believed that war cannot be rationalized and calculated, as it does not follow the laws of proportionality and integration, and cannot be fully understood and analyzed with rational and accounting minds. He says in one of his definitions of war: “War is like a chameleon that changes its color every moment, and in its generality, it consists of a trinity consisting of: first, pure violence, hatred, and aggression, which can be considered a blind instinct that drives this conflict for survival. Secondly, open possibilities and coincidence that form a prelude to creativity. And thirdly, political will that refers to another level no less complex than the field of actual war.”

This does not mean, of course, ignoring all strategic planning efforts or building a solid theory of war dynamics and assessing power balances in war, but it illustrates that the field of war reveals many logistical problems that cannot be calculated. Atmospheric conditions are unfavorable, discipline is lacking, hesitation and fear, organizational weakness, doubt, all factors that make war differ in reality and on the ground from plans laid out on paper, as chance and friction play a major role in war and its courses. The uncertain factors and unexpected circumstances label war with its “relativity” and distance it from absolutism. Here, the extent of the dynamic nature of war becomes clear.

During the 1970s, in his comment on the course of the American war against Vietnam, one of America’s most important architects of foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, wrote: “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political battle. We sought physical exhaustion. Our opponents aimed to exhaust us mentally. In this process, we lost sight of one of the fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare: guerrilla warfare wins if it does not lose. And the traditional army loses if it does not win.”

This indicates that the idea of resistance does not necessarily depend on the possibility of defeating the occupation, but aims to force it to pay the price and exhaust it, so that it decides to withdraw or so that its forces are weakened enough to be ready for the decisive blow when resistance accumulates its forces to this moment, or to subject the occupation to sit at the negotiating table.

Many strategists realize that guerrilla warfare and urban combat are extremely difficult, so most of them advise their countries’ armies to avoid such wars because they require a great effort in terms of numbers, equipment, and time. In the city, forces are equal, and the tank becomes a sweet morsel for a lighter weapon even than a mortar shell. In the city, the tank becomes blind. While each defender requires 6 or more attackers. The difference between the defender and the attacker is that the former knows the place and time. So, the field is his playground, his home is nearby, and his safe haven is present, and he is fully engaged in the social environment, and his war is a matter of life or death.

In urban warfare, every destruction caused by the attacker due to its firepower becomes an obstacle and barrier to its tank from advancing further, and at the same time turns into a stronghold for the defender when it snipes the tank.

Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that each urban war has its own circumstances and situation, and the experience of one city cannot be extrapolated to another. But the common thing among them, besides destruction and human losses, is that they become a trap for the attacker, who is usually the occupier, while the land then becomes a real resistance with its people, not a metaphor, so it is mined and ambushed heavily, and becomes a hell for the occupation as long as the resistance continues.

The Gaza war combined and blended all these theories and data, as the occupation besieged Gaza, thinking that it would quickly reap a victory that would reshape the Middle East region and make the Palestinian issue a closed chapter in the history books, but Gaza is the one that besieged it and made it unable to get out except defeated.